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ABSTRACT 
 
Police rely on eyewitness identifications to solve crimes, but eyewitnesses can make 
mistakes. These mistakes in decision-making can have serious consequences for the criminal 
justice system. Eyewitnesses can erroneously identify an innocent suspect as the culprit, which 
could result in a wrongful conviction, or fail to identify a guilty suspect as the culprit, which 
could result in the culprit avoiding punishment. Drawing on Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-
aggression hypothesis, the current study tested whether eyewitnesses' status as either a victim or 
a bystander influenced their decision-making processes in a showup procedure after eliminating 
attention and encoding as possible mediators of the victim-bystander status manipulation. 
Although victims reported significantly higher feelings of anger than bystanders, victims did not 
significantly differ from bystanders in identification rates, confidence ratings, response latency, 
or motivation to catch the guilty culprit. In addition, victims did not significantly differ from 
bystanders in their ability to distinguish between guilty culprits and innocent suspects. However, 
analysis of post-identification judgments revealed that victims who made identified innocent 
suspects reported paying significantly more attention to the culprit, recalling significantly more 
specific facial features of the culprit, and having a significantly clearer image of the culprit’s face 
than bystanders. In addition, victims reported being significantly more willing to testify in court 
regarding their identification decision than bystanders. These findings suggest that victims may 
increase the potency of their positive identifications by bolstering responses to post-identification 
judgments. Consequently, victims may give the appearance of having a greater ability to 
accurately identify guilty culprits than bystanders, even in the absence of true differences.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Police rely on eyewitness identifications to solve crimes, but psychological research and 
DNA exoneration cases have shown that eyewitness identification evidence is often unreliable 
(Innocence Project, 2019; Wells & Olson, 2003). Nevertheless, eyewitness testimony remains an 
important source of evidence in the criminal justice system. Understanding how eyewitnesses 
make decisions will deepen current understanding of eyewitnesses’ potential for error and allow 
the field to develop best practices. Using a novel experimental paradigm in which participants 
believed that a real crime had occurred, the current study aimed to test whether an eyewitness’ 
status as either a victim or a bystander influences decision-making in the manner predicted by 
Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis. To limit the effects under consideration to 
eyewitness decision-making during and after the identification procedure, the victim-bystander 
status manipulation was delayed until immediately prior to the showup procedure. This 
eliminated attention to and encoding of the culprit as possible mediators of the victim-bystander 
status manipulation. In addition, this study examined decision-making in the context of showups: 
an identification procedure in which an eyewitness is presented with a single suspect and the 
eyewitness then decides whether the person presented is the culprit (Smith, Wells, Lindsay, & 
Penrod, 2017). 
Using Berkowitz’s (1989) revised frustration-aggression hypothesis as a theoretical 
framework, positive identifications during an eyewitness procedure can be defined as aggressive 
behavior. If victims experience a criminal event as more frustrating than bystanders, victims 
should experience increased anger and an increased desire to resolve the criminal event by 
making a positive identification. In addition, victims’ increased aggression should lead to 
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bolstering of self-reported ability to accurately identify the culprit and self-reported decision-
making performance. Bolstering increases the potency of a positive identification by making an 
identification appear more trustworthy to investigators, thereby increasing the likelihood that the 
criminal event is resolved. Three objectives were developed to test this theoretical framework. 
The first objective was to test whether victim-bystander status influenced decision-making at the 
time of identification, specifically, identification rates, confidence ratings, and response latency. 
The second objective was to test whether victim-bystander status influenced post-identification 
judgments of self-reported ability to identify the culprit and self-reported certainty in positive 
identifications. The third objective was to test whether the effects of victim-bystander status on 
decision-making were mediated by anger and desire to resolve the criminal event.  
By addressing these objectives, this research advances understanding about eyewitness 
decision-making processes and examines implications for identification performance and 
eyewitness testimony. The current chapter discusses case law and research relevant to police 
showup procedures, outlines factors influencing eyewitness identification, and provides an 
overview of eyewitness decision-making and its relation to Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-
aggression hypothesis.  
The Use of Showup Procedures in the United States 
The majority of eyewitness identification studies have focused on the police lineup: a 
procedure in which a criminal suspect is placed among known innocents (i.e., fillers) and is then 
shown to an eyewitness to determine if the eyewitness can identify the suspect as the culprit 
(Wells & Olson, 2003). This study focused on a less-studied procedure: the showup. A showup is 
an identification procedure in which an eyewitness is presented with a single suspect and the 
eyewitness then decides whether the person presented is the culprit (Smith et al., 2017). Recent 
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behavioral science research has demonstrated that showups are suggestive and promote worse 
applied outcomes than lineups (Smith et al., 2017). It is important to note, however, that lineups 
are not superior to showups because they improve eyewitnesses’ ability to distinguish between 
innocent suspects and guilty culprits. Indeed, showups have been shown to produce more correct 
rejections than lineups (Smith et al., 2017). Instead, the lower rate of innocent suspect 
identifications in lineups can be attributed to differential filler siphoning, whereby false alarms 
are spread away from the innocent suspect and toward the lineup fillers (Smith et al., 2017). As 
showups have no fillers to draw away false alarms from an innocent suspect, showups result in 
more false identifications of innocent suspects than lineups.  
Despite this evidence, showups are still used by approximately 62% of police agencies in 
the United States. This makes showups second only to photo lineups (used by over 94% of 
agencies), and considerably more common than other identification procedures such as 
composite sketches (35.5%), mugshot searches (28.8%), and live lineups (21.4%) (Police 
Executive Research Forum, 2013). The argument by police in favor of showups is largely 
practical. To be detained long enough to conduct a live lineup, suspects need to be placed under 
arrest. Likewise, creating a lineup and presenting it to a witness is time consuming, even if 
photos of the suspect and potential fillers already exist in police records. Showups, on the other 
hand, can be conducted quickly and do not require the suspect to be detained for a long period of 
time (Smith, Wells, Lindsay, Myerson, Kovera, & McAuliff, 2018). Furthermore, even a 
detained, arrested suspect can agree to a showup rather than a lineup. These facts mean that 
showups will likely not be abandoned by police departments in the near future. As such, 
showups remain an important area of study and researchers should continue to examine showups 
and develop procedures to improve their diagnostic value.  
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Case Law Related to Showups 
The Supreme Court recognized the substantial risks of bias in lineups and showups as 
early as the 1960s. In a series of cases known as the Wade Trilogy (United States v. Wade, 1967; 
Gilbert v. California, 1967; Stovall v. Denno, 1967), the Court established the totality of the 
circumstances standard for admissibility of showup and lineup evidence in court (Agricola, 
2009). Notably, the Court considered the dangers of suggestion to be stronger in showups.  
In the 1970s, however, the Court established a new view of the totality of the 
circumstances standard in two seminal cases. In Neil v. Biggers (1972), the Court outlined five 
factors to be considered when evaluating the reliability and admissibility of showups: (1) 
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree 
of attention at the time of the crime, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the 
criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at identification, and (5) the 
length of time between the crime and the identification. The Court then reaffirmed this new 
standard in Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), ruling that a flawed procedure did not necessarily 
invalidate an identification when the procedure satisfied all or some of these guidelines. In 
practice, however, the courts have rarely found a showup to be so suggestive as to warrant a 
reversal of a criminal conviction; few, if any, showups are ever excluded under the current 
standards (Cicchini & Easton, 2010).  
Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances standard has not survived scientific 
scrutiny. Research on eyewitness identification has demonstrated that, when compared to lineup 
procedures, showups lead to more innocent suspect identifications and similar rates of guilty 
culprit identifications (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2003; Wetmore, Neuschatz, 
Gronlund, Wooten, Goodsell, & Carlson, 2015). This has led experts to recommend additional 
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legal reforms and has even led some experts to conclude that showups should not be allowed as 
evidence in court (e.g., Agricola, 2009). Recently, New York, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin 
have adopted reforms that prohibit showups as evidence unless police lacked probable cause to 
arrest and detain the suspect long enough to construct a photo lineup, or exigent circumstances 
prevented the use of a photo lineup (Cicchini & Easton, 2010). However, these reforms are not 
intended to prevent the use of showups entirely. Although the legal system has recognized 
potential problems with showups, showups will likely continue to be used under the legal 
presumption that they have probative value. Accordingly, it remains important to study the 
psychological processes that operate during showups. 
Factors Influencing Eyewitness Identification 
To better understand the processes that operate during eyewitness identification, a 
taxonomy has been developed to categorize factors that influence eyewitness performance 
(Wells, 1978; Wells & Olson, 2003). Factors outside the justice system’s control are known as 
estimator variables; factors under the control of the criminal justice system are known as system 
variables. The following section outlines relevant research on these factors. 
Estimator Variables 
Two categories of estimator variables can influence eyewitness accuracy: characteristics 
of the eyewitness (e.g., the cross-race effect) and characteristics of the witnessed event (e.g., a 
suspect wearing a disguise; Wells & Olson, 2003). Most estimator variable research has 
examined the effects of these variables using lineups; few studies have examined their effects 
using showups. One estimator variable that has been examined using showups is clothing bias. 
Clothing bias occurs when a suspect appears in the identification procedure wearing clothing 
similar to the culprit’s clothing described by eyewitnesses, and has been shown to increase false 
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identifications in lineups, mug shots, and showups (Dysart, Lindsay, & Dupuis, 2006; Lindsay, 
Wallbridge, & Drennan, 1987; Lindsay, Nosworthy, Martin, & Martynuck, 1994; Yarmey, 
Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1996). This demonstrates that estimator variables that negatively impact 
eyewitness accuracy in lineups may also have detrimental effects in showups.  
System Variables 
System variables, on the other hand, can be organized into five categories: instructions to 
the witness (e.g., instructing the witness that it is equally important to clear the innocent and 
identify the guilty), content of the identification procedure (e.g., selection of fillers), presentation 
method (e.g., simultaneous vs. sequential lineups), behavioral influence (e.g., use of double-blind 
procedures), and base rates (e.g., how likely it is that a suspect is innocent) (Wells & Olson, 
2003; Smalarz & Wells, 2014). For example, researchers and the Department of Justice have 
recommended the use of a “may or may not be present” instruction (otherwise known as the 
“standard admonition”) for nearly two decades (Clark, 2012; Technical Working Group for 
Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). Employing the standard admonition in lineups has been shown to 
reduce mistaken identifications in culprit-absent lineups by 41.6% while reducing accurate 
identifications by only 1.9% (Steblay, 1997). Accordingly, system variables like the standard 
admonition can provide relatively simple techniques for police to offset the limitations of 
eyewitness procedures.   
Eyewitness Decision-Making  
In a showup procedure, a guilty culprit is either present or not, and an eyewitness either 
identifies the guilty culprit or does not. Therefore, there are four possible outcomes: a hit (the 
guilty culprit is present and the eyewitness makes a positive identification), a miss (the guilty 
culprit is present and the eyewitness rejects the showup by refusing to make an identification), a 
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false alarm (an innocent suspect is present and the eyewitness makes a positive identification), or 
a correct rejection (an innocent suspect is present and the eyewitness rejects the showup by 
refusing to make an identification). Ideally, an eyewitness should always make a positive 
identification when the guilty culprit is present and should always reject the showup when an 
innocent suspect is present. Of course, eyewitnesses can and do make mistakes (Innocence 
Project, 2019). Therefore, it is important to examine how eyewitness decision-making can lead to 
errors. To this end, the current study examined eyewitnesses’ decision-making at the time of 
identification and eyewitnesses’ post-identification judgments. 
Decision-Making at Identification 
Eyewitness decision-making outcomes at the time of an identification procedure include 
identification rates, confidence ratings, and response latency. Identification rates reflect the ratio 
of positive identifications to non-identifications in a sample of eyewitnesses. Any shift in 
eyewitnesses’ identification rates will yield a corresponding tradeoff in costs and benefits 
(Dobolyi & Dodson, 2013; Palmer & Brewer, 2012). Higher identification rates will increase hits 
but also increase false alarms. Conversely, lower identification rates will decrease false alarms 
but also decrease hits. However, it is important to note that as identification rates shift, the ratio 
of correct decisions to errors remains the same. In other words, shifts in identification rates do 
not correspond to changes in eyewitnesses’ ability to distinguish between guilty culprits and 
innocent suspects (Palmer & Brewer, 2012). Instead, eyewitnesses’ ability to distinguish between 
guilty culprits and innocent suspects is reflected by shifts in the ratio of hits to false alarms. 
When hits are frequent and false alarms are rare, one can infer that eyewitnesses can easily 
distinguish between guilty culprits and innocent suspects. On the other hand, when the ratio of 
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hits and false alarms are close to equal, one can infer that eyewitnesses are performing no better 
than chance in a showup procedure.   
Confidence is an eyewitness’ certainty in her or his identification decision. For an 
eyewitness who makes a positive identification, confidence indicates her or his level of certainty 
that the person she or he identified is the guilty culprit. For an eyewitness who rejects a showup, 
confidence indicates certainty that the guilty culprit was not present. One can further distinguish 
between immediate and delayed confidence. Immediate confidence refers to confidence ratings 
given immediately following the showup procedure, whereas delayed confidence refers to 
confidence ratings given in a post-identification setting, up to and including testimony in court. 
Recent research has indicated that confidence ratings can shift as soon as 10 minutes after an 
identification procedure (Eisen, Cedré, Williams, Jones, Kovera, & McAuliff, 2018). Therefore, 
it is important to examine effects on both immediate and delayed confidence judgments.  
Response latency is the time from when an eyewitness is first presented with a suspect to 
when the eyewitness makes a final identification decision (Brewer, Caon, Todd, & Weber, 2006; 
Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004). Past research has shown that response latency 
can provide useful information about eyewitness decision-making and performance. For 
example, faster reaction times are reliably associated with higher accuracy, as stronger memory 
traces of the culprit’s face are easier to retrieve than weak memory traces (Robinson, Johnson, 
Herndon, & Murphy, 1997). However, the relationship between response latency and accuracy is 
relatively weak and the time frame for accurate identifications is highly variable across 
experiments and situations, ranging from 5 to 29 seconds (Brewer et al., 2006; Weber et al., 
2004). Furthermore, it is important to note that response latency is not the same as reaction time; 
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response latency is a less precise tool than reaction time and therefore has less ability to detect 
effects on eyewitness decision-making (Brewer et al., 2006).  
Post-Identification Judgments 
 In the real world, eyewitness decision-making does not end after an identification 
decision is reached. Eyewitnesses may also be asked to testify in court regarding their 
identification decision and the witnessed criminal event. Past research suggests that 
eyewitnesses’ testimony is evaluated based on how confident eyewitnesses are, what 
eyewitnesses claim about their viewing conditions, and how much attention eyewitnesses claim 
they paid during the criminal event (Bradfield & Wells, 2000). When eyewitnesses are not given 
feedback or influenced in any way, mock-jurors can accurately differentiate between correct and 
mistaken eyewitness testimony (Smalarz, Wells, & Kovera, 2014). However, mock-jurors’ 
ability to distinguish between accurate and mistaken eyewitness testimony disappears when 
eyewitnesses receive even minor confirming feedback about their identification decision (Eisen, 
2018; Smalarz, Wells, & Kovera, 2014). 
To date, eyewitness research has identified several system variables that influence post-
identification decision-making and eyewitness testimony, such as steering effects and post-
identification feedback (Eisen et al., 2018; Smalarz, Wells, & Kovera, 2014). However, it is also 
possible that estimator variables can influence eyewitnesses’ perceptions regarding the witnessed 
event and their ability to make an accurate identification. Indeed, there is no theoretical reason to 
believe that estimator variable effects on eyewitness decision-making stop after an identification 
decision is made. Therefore, it is important to examine effects on eyewitness decision-making 
both during and after an identification procedure.  
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Decision-making at identification revolves around eyewitnesses’ decisions to make a 
positive identification or reject the showup procedure. In contrast, decision-making in the post-
identification stage can be distilled down to two types of judgments: eyewitnesses’ perceived 
ability to correctly identify the culprit and, among eyewitnesses who make a positive 
identification, eyewitnesses’ perceived certainty in their identification decision. Eyewitnesses’ 
perceived ability to identify the culprit stems from perceived viewing conditions and memory for 
the culprit at the time of the crime. Perceived certainty in a positive identification, on the other 
hand, is reflected by judgments related to ease of identification, delayed confidence ratings, and 
time needed to make an identification. Eyewitnesses’ judgments in both of these categories can 
impact the nature and believability of their testimony. 
Victim-Bystander Status and the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis 
Victim-bystander status is one estimator variable that could potentially influence 
eyewitnesses’ decision-making during and after an identification. There is theoretical reason to 
believe that victims are more likely to make an identification than bystanders. Under Berkowitz’s 
(1989) revised formulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, frustrations are defined as 
aversive events that people would normally seek to avoid and that give rise to aggressive 
behavior. These unpleasant events produce negative affect (i.e., feelings that individuals seek to 
reduce or eliminate), which in turn generates aggressive tendencies (Berkowitz, 1989). Although 
Berkowitz posited that any kind of negative affect will produce aggressive inclinations, the 
revised frustration-aggression hypothesis specifically highlights the role of anger. However, the 
presence of an aversive event and feelings of anger are not sufficient by themselves to produce 
aggressive behavior. Rather, aggression is likely to occur following aversive events if a suitable 
target is nearby, if non-aggressive behaviors do not eliminate the aversive event, if restraints 
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against aggression are relatively weak, and if the aversive event is perceived as a deliberate 
personal attack (Berkowitz, 1989).  
Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis has two implications for victim-
bystander status and eyewitness identification. First, crime can be viewed in the context of the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis as a deliberate and unjustified aversive event. Although 
bystanders may experience a criminal event as aversive, victims of a crime may additionally 
experience it as a personal attack. Second, a positive identification of a suspect has potential 
negative consequences for the suspect, regardless of the suspect’s guilt or innocence. Therefore, 
identifying a suspect as the guilty culprit can be framed as an act of aggression. The following 
section examines how the frustration-aggression hypothesis can inform predictions regarding the 
effects of victim-bystander status on eyewitness decision-making, both during and after an 
identification. 
Aggression and Eyewitness Decision-Making 
The following section considers the effects of victim-bystander status on eyewitness 
aggression in terms of decision-making at identification and post-identification judgments. In 
addition, this section examines two potential mediators of the relationship between victim-
bystander status and eyewitness aggression: anger and desire to resolve the aversive event.  
Decision-making at identification. As noted earlier, there are typically three 
components to eyewitness decision-making at the time of an identification: the identification 
decision itself, immediate confidence ratings, and response latency. In terms of Berkowitz’s 
(1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis, the offer of a potential identification of the culprit 
allows both victims and bystanders a chance to eliminate the aversive event (i.e., by catching the 
culprit). However, because the aversive event is more personal and frustrating for the victim than 
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the bystander, victims should experience greater anger and an increased desire to resolve the 
aversive event. This increase in anger and desire to resolve the aversive event should lead to 
victims having a higher tendency to aggress against the culprit by making a positive 
identification. Therefore, victims should make more positive identifications of both guilty 
culprits and innocent suspects, resulting in an increase in identification rates compared to 
bystanders. 
Whereas positively identifying a suspect can be considered an aggressive act under 
Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis, immediate confidence ratings and 
response latency can be considered behaviors that increase the potency of the aggressive act. In 
other words, among eyewitnesses who do aggress by making a positive identification, these 
decision-making outcomes reflect the strength or potency of aggression. Higher confidence by 
eyewitnesses who make a positive identification conveys increased certainty to investigators that 
the suspect is, indeed, the culprit. Thus, expressions of greater confidence may be perceived by 
eyewitnesses as enabling faster resolution of the criminal event. If victims do experience a 
greater desire to resolve the aversive event than bystanders, it follows that victims should express 
higher confidence than bystanders in their positive identifications, in order to increase the 
likelihood that the identified suspect will be captured and punished.  
It is also possible that victim-bystander status could influence response latency. One 
theoretical explanation for this effect lies in Berkowitz’s (1990) cognitive neoassociative model: 
victimization generates anger, which in turn activates ideas, memories, and schemas associated 
with aggression. This increased activation of aggression schemas due to victimization may result 
in victim-bystander status facilitating an aggressive response, thereby causing eyewitnesses to 
make identifications sooner and resulting in faster response latency (Berkowitz, 1990). However, 
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it should be noted that faster response latency due to the priming effect of victim-bystander 
status does not necessarily need to operate via anger, as Berkowitz (1990) suggests. Aggression 
schemas could also be directly activated by victimization via semantic priming (Hutchison, 
2003). With that said, both theoretical explanations suggest that victims should have faster 
response latency when making an identification than bystanders.  
Post-identification judgments. As with immediate confidence ratings and response 
latency, post-identification judgments may also reflect the strength of eyewitnesses’ aggression. 
Specifically, eyewitnesses who aggress by making a positive identification may bolster their 
post-identification judgments in order to frame their positive identification decision as 
trustworthy and reliable, enabling faster resolution of the aversive event. Eyewitnesses may be 
particularly likely to do so when their post-identification judgments could have an impact on the 
resolution of the criminal event. Therefore, an examination of post-identification judgments in 
the context of the frustration-aggression hypothesis requires that eyewitnesses believe that their 
post-identification judgments could have a real impact on the case.  
Mediators of eyewitness aggression. Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression 
hypothesis highlights two potential mediators of aggressive behavior: anger and desire to resolve 
aversive events. Notably, the revised frustration-aggression hypothesis states that not all aversive 
events are equally frustrating and that not all individuals will experience an aversive event in the 
same way. Instead, the exact nature of the aversive event is not as important as the intensity of 
the resulting negative affect, and, in particular, the intensity of the resulting feelings of anger 
(Berkowitz, 1989). If victims do experience a criminal event as more aversive than bystanders, 
one would therefore expect that victims would report experiencing greater anger at the time of 
the aversive event.  
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Although Berkowitz primarily focused on the role of negative affect in his revised 
formulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (1989), individuals must also experience a 
desire to resolve the aversive event before an aversive event results in aggressive tendencies. 
When social norms prohibit an aggressive response or when an event is simply seen as not 
aversive enough to warrant frustration, individuals may not feel the need to resolve the event by 
acting aggressively (Berkowitz, 1989; Cohen, 1955). In an eyewitness identification setting, 
social norms do not necessarily prohibit eyewitnesses from making a positive identification; in 
fact, one can consider social norms as encouraging eyewitnesses to make a positive 
identification. Eyewitnesses’ motivation to catch the guilty culprit is, of course, tempered by a 
motivation to avoid identifying innocent suspects. However, this does not take away from the 
fact that, in order for an eyewitness to help resolve a criminal event, she or he must make an 
identification decision that results in the capture of the guilty culprit. A positive identification of 
the guilty culprit moves an eyewitness closer to resolving the event, whereas the rejection of an 
innocent suspect does not. It follows that victims’ higher desire to resolve the aversive event 
should lead to victims being more motivated than bystanders to catch the guilty culprit.  
Review of Previous Victim-Bystander Research 
The procedures used in this study were adapted from two studies that investigated the 
effects of victim-bystander status on eyewitness decision-making. In the first study (Hosch & 
Cooper, 1982), victim-bystander status manipulated whether participants believed that a 
confederate had stolen a participant’s watch (victim condition), a calculator belonging to the 
laboratory (bystander condition), or neither (control condition). In the second study (Kassin, 
1984), victim-bystander status manipulated whether participants believed that a thief had stolen 
money from them (victim condition) or their partner (bystander condition). In both studies, 
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participants were run in pairs and were presented with a single culprit-present lineup. Notably, 
these studies produced conflicting findings regarding victim-bystander status. There were no 
significant differences in accuracy between victims and bystanders in the first study, although 
accuracy was significantly worse in the no-theft condition (Hosch & Cooper, 1982). In contrast, 
victims were significantly less accurate than bystanders in the second study, with no victims 
making a correct identification of the culprit (Kassin, 1984).  
Five limitations of these studies reduced their utility in examining the effects of victim-
bystander status on eyewitness decision-making. First, both studies had small sample sizes: 33 
pairs of participants in the Hosch and Cooper (1982) study and 15 pairs of participants in the 
Kassin (1984) study. The low statistical power of these studies reduces confidence in the 
estimates of effect sizes for victim-bystander status.  
Second, although running participants in pairs can facilitate data collection, doing so 
removes an experimenter’s ability to control for effects of the partner on the participant. It is 
possible, for example, that bystanders’ or victims’ reactions to a theft may drive eyewitnesses’ 
decision-making, rather than the psychological impact of victimization on eyewitnesses. 
Although the effect of partner reactions on eyewitness decision-making may be an important 
area to address, a thorough examination of victim-bystander status should either account for 
these effects or eliminate them as a possible mediator.  
Third, both studies only employed culprit-present lineups, preventing a full analysis of 
eyewitness performance. In experimental studies examining eyewitness decision-making, a 
culprit-absent lineup or showup is necessary to calculate the diagnostic value of suspect 
identifications by using the ratio of hits in culprit-present lineups to false alarms in culprit-absent 
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lineups (Wells & Olson, 2003). In other words, these preliminary studies on victim-bystander 
status only had the potential to capture one half of eyewitness decision-making.  
Fourth, participants in both studies were aware of their victim-bystander status at the time 
of the theft. This may have led to differential attention and encoding of the culprit, in addition to 
differential identification rates at identification. In other words, victims may have paid attention 
to the culprit in a manner different from bystanders at the time of the crime, leading to 
differences in accuracy that cannot solely be attributed to identification rates. This makes it 
difficult to pinpoint whether the effects of victim-bystander status influence decision-making 
during encoding, after encoding, or both. 
Finally, in both studies participants were debriefed about the staged theft prior to 
identification. This means that participants were aware that their identification decision would 
have no actual consequences for the culprit, the victim, or the bystander. In the real world, 
eyewitness identification procedures always involve consequences and risk. A missed 
identification can lead to a culprit getting away while an identification of an innocent suspect can 
result in wrongful conviction. Debriefing participants prior to the identification procedure 
removes these consequences from an eyewitness’ decision-making calculus. 
With that said, little is known about decision-making by eyewitnesses who believe that 
their decisions could have real consequences. Almost all experimental eyewitness studies have 
examined eyewitness decision-making in the absence of perceived real-world consequences (for 
a notable exception, see Eisen et al., 2017). That is, participants in most eyewitness studies do 
not believe that an incorrect identification has any additional cost beyond simply being wrong. In 
addition to reducing generalizability of the findings to the real world, it is possible that 
perceptions of the victimization and identification consequences as real are prerequisites for 
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victim-bystander effects on eyewitness decision-making. However, neither of the paradigms used 
in the Hosch and Cooper (1982) or Kassin (1984) studies can account for these effects.  
Hypotheses 
Based on Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis, victims should 
experience greater anger and an increased desire to resolve the aversive event. This increase in 
anger and desire to resolve the aversive event should lead to victims having a higher tendency to 
aggress against the culprit by making a positive identification. Therefore, my primary prediction 
was that victims would have higher identification rates than bystanders. In addition, higher 
confidence ratings convey greater certainty in a positive identification to investigators. Finally, 
Berkowitz’ (1989) frustration aggression hypothesis suggests that victims should have faster 
response latency than bystanders, in order to resolve the aversive event in a faster manner, 
whereas Berkowitz’s (1990) cognitive neoassociation model suggests that victimization will 
activate aggression schemas that will lead to faster identifications and therefore faster response 
latency. Therefore, I also predicted that victims who made a positive identification would have 
higher immediate confidence ratings than bystanders and take less time than bystanders to make 
positive identifications.  
In this study, the effects of victim-bystander status on post-identification judgments were 
examined in terms of eyewitnesses’ perceived ability to correctly identify the culprit and 
eyewitnesses’ perceived certainty in their positive identification decision. Bolstering responses to 
post-identification judgments increases the apparent reliability of eyewitnesses’ positive 
identification in the eyes of investigators, thereby increasing the potency of eyewitnesses’ 
positive identification and enabling faster resolution of the criminal event. However, it is 
important to note that this only applies to eyewitnesses who chose to aggress by making a 
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positive identification. Eyewitnesses who reject a showup gain no benefit from bolstering their 
post-identification judgments, as a non-identification does not move a criminal event closer to 
resolution. Therefore, it was predicted that, among eyewitnesses who made a positive 
identification, victims would respond to post-identification judgments in a way that bolsters the 
apparent reliability of their positive identification. 
To this end, I made several predictions regarding the specific manner in which victims’ 
bolstering of post-identification judgments would occur. In regards to eyewitnesses’ perceived 
ability to correctly identify the culprit, it was predicted that, compared to bystanders, victims 
who made a positive identification would report (1) a better view the culprit, (2) better ability to 
make out specific features of the culprit’s face, (3) more attention paid to the culprit’s face, (4) a 
clearer image of the culprit, and (5) better general recognition memory for strangers’ faces in 
general. In regards to eyewitnesses’ perceived certainty in their positive identification, it was 
predicted that, compared to bystanders, victims who made a positive identification would report 
(1) higher delayed confidence, (2) a better basis to make the identification, (3) greater ease in 
identifying the culprit, and (4) less time to make the identification. In addition to these post-
identification judgments of ability and certainty, I also predicted that victims would report higher 
willingness to testify in court than bystanders that the person they identified was the culprit. 
Finally, I made two predictions regarding the effect of victim-bystander status on the 
potential mediators of anger and motivation to catch the guilty culprit. According to Berkowitz’s 
(1989) revised frustration-aggression hypothesis, aversive events produce anger and that this 
increase in anger leads to aggressive tendencies. Therefore, I predicted that victims would report 
greater anger than bystanders when informed that a thief had stolen their cellphone, and that this 
increase in anger would mediate the effects of victim-bystander status on eyewitness decision-
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making.  The revised frustration-aggression hypothesis also suggests that aversive events only 
produce aggressive tendencies when one has a desire to resolve the aversive event. In this study, 
desire to resolve the aversive event was assessed indirectly in terms of eyewitnesses’ motivation 
to catch the guilty culprit. Therefore, I predicted that victims would report a higher motivation to 
catch the guilty culprit than bystanders, and that this increased motivation to catch the guilty 
culprit would mediate the effects of victim-bystander status on eyewitness decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHOD 
 
Methods 
Sample Size Estimation 
Power analysis for logistic regression was conducted using the guidelines established in 
the G*Power 3.1.7 manual (Faul, Erfdelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to determine a sufficient 
sample size using an alpha of 0.05, a power of 0.80, a small effect size (odds ratio = 1.44), a two-
tailed test, and a probability of identifying the guilty culprit equal to 0.5. Based on these 
parameters, the minimum sample size required to detect the proposed effect is 253. The sample 
size in this experiment exceeded this minimum. 
Participants 
Participants (n = 332) were adult undergraduates enrolled in courses at Iowa State 
University who received course credit for their participation. Nine participants were removed 
due to high suspicion and an additional nine participants were removed because they either 
reported not seeing the thief enter the room or were an acquaintance, friend, or relative of the 
thief. Finally, a total of 22 participants were terminated early due to technical issues. However, 
eleven of these participants encountered technical issues after completing the identification 
procedure and were therefore only excluded from analyses that used post-identification 
measures. This resulted in final sample sizes of 303 for the main analyses and 292 for the post-
identification analyses. Participants averaged 19.2 years of age and 185 (61.1 %) were female. 
The majority of participants were of European ancestry: European (82.5 %), African American 
(3.6 %), Native American (0.7 %), Latin American, Hispanic, or Latina/o (4.3 %), Middle 
Eastern (0.3 %), Asian or Pacific Islander (3.6%), and “Other” (4.3 %).  
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Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (victim-bystander status: bystander vs. victim) 
× 2 (culprit presence: culprit present vs culprit absent) between-subjects experimental design. 
Participants were run individually, with a confederate playing the role of their partner (referred 
to subsequently as the “partner”). Victim-bystander status manipulated whether participants 
believed that a thief stole either their cellphone (victim condition) or their partner’s cellphone 
(bystander condition). Culprit presence manipulated whether the showup presented participants 
with the guilty culprit (culprit-present condition) or one of several innocent suspects (culprit-
absent condition). Victim-bystander status was effect-coded such that bystander = –1 and victim 
= +1; culprit presence was effect-coded such that absent = –1 and present = +1.   
Materials 
Demographics Questionnaire (Appendix A) 
Participants reported their age, sex, and ethnicity.  
Bogus Communication Task (Appendix B) 
The bogus communication task involved a drawing task in which the participant and her 
or his partner sat back-to-back to recreate a series of simple shapes with only limited verbal 
instructions. The bogus communication task always lasted 5 minutes. This task justified the 
presence of the partner, who was necessary to create a situation in which the participant was the 
bystander, and their partner the victim. 
Partner Ratings (Appendix B) 
Using five-point bipolar scales with anchors of 1 and 5, participants rated their partner on 
the following traits: unfriendly vs. friendly, quiet vs. talkative, dependent vs. independent, 
unintelligent vs. intelligent, needy vs. self-reliant, unlikeable vs. likeable, and gave directions 
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poorly vs. gave directions well. Participants also reported what they liked best and least about 
their partner in two open-ended questions. Finally, participants rated the degree to which they 
would prefer to work with the same partner or a different partner in the future on a 6-point Likert 
scale that ranged from 1 (strong preference for a different partner) to 6 (strong preference for 
the same partner).  
Culprit and Innocent Suspect Photographs (Appendix C) 
Photographs used in the showup procedure were taken using a Digital Single Lens Reflex 
(DSLR) camera. All photographs were in full color against a white background. To offset the 
effects of clothing bias (Dysart, Lindsay, & Dupuis, 2006), all culprits and innocent suspects had 
a white cloth placed over their clothing while their photograph was taken. All culprits and 
innocent suspects maintained a neutral facial expression during the procedure. Five thieves and 
fifteen corresponding innocent suspect photographs were used to achieve stimulus sampling. 
Consistent with past recommendations on filler selection (Fitzgerald, Oriet, & Price, 2015), the 
innocent suspect photographs were of individuals matched to the culprit’s description. No 
photograph had identifying information attached to it.  
Immediate Confidence Ratings 
 Immediate confidence ratings consisted of one of two verbal questions asked by the 
experimenter. Participants who made a positive identification during the showup procedure were 
asked, “So…on a scale of 1-10, how confident are you that this was the thief?” Participants who 
did not make an identification during the showup procedure were asked, “So…on a scale of 1-
10, how confident are you that this was not the thief?” Responses were recorded on Qualtrics by 
the experimenter. 
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Response Latency Measurement 
 Response latency was measured using a hidden Qualtrics timer that began when the 
experimenter first displayed one of the photographs during the showup procedure and ended 
when the participant indicated that she or he had made a final decision and the experimenter 
clicked the “next” button on Qualtrics.  
Suspicion Check Form (Appendix D) 
 A suspicion check form assessed participants’ prior knowledge of the experiment and 
whether participants believed that the researchers were investigating something different from 
what they told the participant. Participants who indicated that they believed the researchers were 
investigating something different from the cover story were also prompted to report what they 
thought the true purpose of the study was. The exact wording of these questions can be found in 
Appendix D. 
Bogus Campus Theft Report (Appendix E) 
The bogus campus theft report, presented via a series of bogus university webpages, 
assessed participants’ reactions and perceptions regarding their identification decision without 
raising suspicion about the purpose of the experiment. The first section of the bogus campus theft 
report included (1) open-ended descriptions of the incident and culprit, (2) whether the 
participant witnessed the cellphone theft, (3) whether the participant saw the culprit, (4) whether 
the culprit was an acquaintance, friend or relative of the participant, and (5) whether the 
participant was asked to identify the culprit from a photograph, showup, or lineup. In addition to 
serving as part of the cover story for the bogus campus theft report, these questions were used to 
screen for participants who did not see the culprit or who knew the thief.  
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The second section of the bogus campus theft report included ten post-identification 
judgments that evaluated participants’ retrospective perceptions regarding the criminal event 
(i.e., the staged cellphone theft) and the showup procedure. These judgments were adopted from 
previous research examining post-identification feedback effects (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 
2004; Smalarz, Wells, & Kovera, 2014). All post-identification judgments were rated on 11-
point scales with anchors of 0 and 10, and are listed below.  
Post-identification judgments of ability to identify the culprit. The first five post-
identification judgments focused on participants’ perceived ability to accurately identify the 
guilty culprit. First, participants were asked how good a view they had of the perpetrator, on a 
scale ranging from 0 (very poor) to 10 (very good). Second, participants were asked how well 
they were able to make out specific features of the perpetrator’s face, on a scale ranging from 0 
(not at all) to 10 (very well).  Third, participants were asked how much attention they paid to the 
perpetrator’s face, on a scale ranging from 0 (none) to 10 (my total attention). Fourth, 
participants were asked for the clarity of their mental image of the perpetrator, on a scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all clear) to 10 (very clear). Fifth, participants were asked how good their 
recognition memory was for faces of strangers that they had encountered on only one prior 
occasion, on a scale ranging from 0 (very poor) to 10 (excellent). 
Post-identification judgments of decision-making performance and willingness to 
testify in court. The next five post-identification judgments focused on participants’ perceived 
certainty that they accurately identified the guilty culprit. First, participants were asked to give a 
delayed confidence rating in their identification decision. The delayed confidence rating asked 
participants how certain they were that the person they identified was the perpetrator, on a scale 
ranging from 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (totally certain). Second, participants were asked 
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how good a basis they had to make an identification, on a scale ranging from 0 (no basis at all) 
to 10 (a very good basis). Third, participants were asked how easy it was for them to discern 
whether the person in the showup was the perpetrator, on a scale ranging from 0 (extremely 
difficult) to 10 (extremely easy). Fourth, participants were asked how much time they took to 
make an identification, on a scale ranging from 0 (I needed almost no time) to 10 (I had to think 
about the showup for a long time). Finally, participants were asked how willing they would have 
been to testify in court that the person they identified was the perpetrator, on a scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all willing) to 10 (totally willing).  
The last section of the bogus campus theft report asked participants whether (1) they had 
ever been a victim of a crime prior to this incident and (2) whether they had ever been a victim of 
cellphone theft prior to this incident. A complete list of the questions in the bogus campus theft 
report is included in Appendix E. 
Shortened Profile of Mood States (Appendix F) 
 The shortened version of the Profile of Mood States (Shacham, 1983) retrospectively 
assessed negative affect at the time of the victim-bystander status manipulation. The shortened 
Profile of Mood States includes six subscales: Tension-Anxiety, Depression-Dejection, Anger-
Hostility, Fatigue-Inertia, Vigor-Activity, and Confusion-Bewilderment. The survey consists of 
37 items that retrospectively assessed participants’ mood at the time they discovered that their 
own or their partner's cellphone was missing. All items were rated on a 5-point scale that ranged 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). A complete list of the items is included in Appendix F. 
Eyewitness Motivation Measures (Appendix G) 
Four questions evaluated whether victim-bystander status influenced participants' 
motivation to avoid a mistaken identification vs. catch the guilty culprit. First, using a 
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dichotomous response option, participants indicated whether it was more important that they "not 
accuse an innocent person of a crime" (coded as 0) or "make sure the guilty culprit didn't get 
away" (coded as 1). Second, participants reported how concerned they were about making each 
of the two potential identification errors using an 8-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (much 
more concerned about identifying an innocent person) to 8 (much more concerned about letting 
the guilty culprit get away with the crime). The final two questions asked participants to rate the 
extent to which they focused on either (1) making sure the guilty culprit didn’t get away or (2) 
not accusing an innocent person of a crime using 6-point forced choice Likert scales that ranged 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Procedure 
The initial posting announcement informed participants that the purpose of the study was 
to investigate differences between face-to-face communication and communication via 
technology. Participants were required to bring a cellphone to the lab for use in the study. After 
obtaining informed consent, the experimenter described the study as an examination of 
differences between face-to-face communication and communication via technology. 
Participants were informed that the study was separated into two parts. In Part 1, participants 
expected to fill out a demographic questionnaire and complete a face-to-face communication 
task. For Part 2, participants expected to complete a similar task using a cellphone. In actuality, 
Part 2 never occurred.  
Following the cover story, the experimenter asked the participant and her or his partner to 
turn off their cellphones and place them in a container in a nearby room. The experimenter then 
used a camera to take a photograph of the participant and her or his partner, ostensibly to be used 
in Part 2 of the study. In reality, the photographs provided an explanation for why the 
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experimenter would have a photograph of a potential suspect later in the experiment. Consistent 
with the procedures used to take the culprit and innocent suspect photographs, the participant 
covered up her or his clothing with a white towel and had her or his photo taken against a white 
background. All participants maintained a neutral facial expression during this procedure. All 
participants’ photographs were deleted directly from the camera and were not transferred from 
the camera or saved in any form. After the photographs were taken, the experimenter then asked 
the participant and her or his partner to leave their cellphones in a separate, interior room of the 
lab space. The partner was moved to another room while the participant stayed in the waiting 
area and completed the demographic questionnaire.  
Staged Cellphone Theft  
At this point, the experimenter informed the participant that the experimenter needed to 
leave the room to retrieve a cable necessary for transferring the photographs from the camera to a 
lab computer. After the experimenter left the room, one of five thieves (three female, two male) 
entered the lab, walked through the waiting area where the participant was sitting, and entered 
the room containing the cellphones. There, the thief moved one of the cellphones to a hidden 
location within the room. In the victim condition, the participant’s cellphone was moved to the 
hidden location, leaving the partner’s phone behind. In the bystander condition, the partner’s 
phone was moved to the hidden location, leaving the participant’s phone behind. During this 
time, the thief was faced away from the participant or hidden from view in the next room. The 
participant was also unaware that a “theft” was occurring. Upon exiting the room containing the 
cellphones, the thief caught the participant’s attention by asking her or him a question (i.e., “Oh, 
sorry – are you a participant?”). This ensured that the participant looked up to encode the thief’s 
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face for approximately 5 to 10 seconds. Because the participant’s partner was behind a closer 
door in a nearby room, only the participant witnessed the thief. The thief then left the lab.  
Retention Interval 
The participant and partner were then reunited to complete two tasks that served as a 10 
minute retention interval following encoding of the thief’s face. The two tasks consisted of the 
back-to-back communication task and partner rating form. When necessary, the experimenter cut 
the tasks short to maintain a consistent 10 minute retention interval. First, the experimenter 
provided instructions for completing the bogus communication task. After 5 minutes, the 
experimenter collected the bogus communication task materials and instructed the participant 
and partner to complete the partner rating survey. After handing the partner rating surveys out, 
the experimenter stated that she or he was going to retrieve the cellphones for use in the next 
task.  
Victim-Bystander Status Manipulation 
The experimenter returned after five minutes and alerted the participant and her or his 
partner to the fact that one of the cellphones was missing. To ensure that the participant was 
aware of which cellphone was missing, the experimenter presented the non-stolen cellphone and 
asked who it belonged to. After collecting the partner rating surveys, the experimenter retrieved a 
laptop from a nearby room and informed the participant that the experimenter would need to 
write an email to the professor in charge of the study. In actuality, the experimenter used the 
laptop to code the participant’s responses on a Qualtrics survey. First, the participant and partner 
were asked if they saw anyone enter the room while the experimenter was gone. If the participant 
said no, the experimenter followed up by asking if the participant was certain that she or he did 
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not see anyone enter the room. If the participant confirmed that she or he saw the thief, the 
experimenter asked for a brief description of the person.  
Showup Procedure 
After the participant’s description of the thief, the partner raised the possibility that the 
thief may be a participant who previously participated in the study. In response, the experimenter 
asked if the participant would be willing to look at a photograph of a prior participant matching 
the current participant’s description of the culprit. If the participant agreed, the experimenter then 
began the showup procedure using a laboratory computer in a nearby room. The participant was 
shown a single, color photograph of either the thief (culprit-present condition) or one of three 
randomly-assigned innocent suspects associated with that thief (culprit-absent condition). Upon 
viewing the photograph on a lab computer, the experimenter verbally asked the participant 
whether the person in the photograph was the thief that she or he saw earlier. The participant’s 
response latency was measured during the showup procedure using a hidden timer on Qualtrics. 
After the participant made a final identification decision, the experimenter verbally asked the 
participant to give an immediate confidence rating for her or his identification decision. The 
experimenter recorded the participant’s identification decision and immediate confidence ratings 
on the laboratory laptop. 
Post-Identification Measures 
At this time, the experimenter assessed participant’s suspicion using a suspicion check 
form. To maintain the cover story, the experimenter told the participant that the suspicion check 
form was related to the communication study, and that it was merely a formality to finish up the 
study in spite of the cellphone theft. Following this, the experimenter pretended to check her or 
his email and informed the participant that the professor in charge of the study responded and 
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said that it was university policy to have witnesses to on-campus crimes fill out a “Campus Theft 
Report”. The participant was directed to a doctored Dean of Students webpage and instructed to 
open the campus crime report via a link on the webpage. The doctored webpage took the 
participant to a Qualtrics survey that included the Campus Theft Report, the shortened Profile of 
Mood States, and eyewitness motivation measures. 
Debriefing 
After the participant completed these measures, the experimenter verbally debriefed the 
participant and returned her or his cellphone if the participant was in the “victim” condition. The 
verbal debriefing highlighted the following key points: (1) the events were staged, (2) the partner 
was a confederate, (3) no theft occurred and the cellphone was not actually missing, and (4) the 
Campus Theft Report form was not real and no authorities were informed about the incident. 
Participants were also provided with a written debriefing containing more details about the study. 
Both the written and verbal debriefing provided a full account of the experiment’s true purpose 
and described the experimental manipulations that were used. At this point, the experimenter 
took time to answer participants’ questions and ended the session. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
Negative Affect 
As a manipulation check of the victim-bystander status manipulation, differences in 
negative affect at the time of the identification were assessed by conducting a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) with victim-bystander status and culprit presence as 
independent variables and participants’ mean scores on the six subscales of the Shortened Profile 
of Mood States (SPOMS) as dependent variables. Total scores for the shortened Profile of Mood 
States were calculated by summing the individual item scores for each of the six subscales. The 
scores from the overall scale were found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s  = .96). Table 1 
presents the means and confidence intervals for the self-reported retrospective negative affect 
measures, organized by experimental effect. Table 2 presents MANOVA results for participants' 
responses to the six subscales of the Shortened Profile of Mood States, organized by 
experimental effect. 
There was a significant main effect of victim-bystander status, Wilk's Λ = .864, F(6, 283) 
= 7.44, p < .001, ηp2  = .13, 95% CI = [.06, .19]. There was no significant main effect of culprit 
presence, Wilk's Λ = .996, F(6, 283) = .19, p = .979, ηp2  < .01, 95% CI = [.00, <.01], and no 
significant interaction between victim-bystander status and culprit presence, Wilk's Λ = .989, 
F(6, 283) = .51, p = .801, ηp2  = .01, 95% CI = [<.01, .02]. This indicates that differences in 
negative affect were primarily caused by the victim-bystander status manipulation.  
Post-hoc ANOVAs were conducted to further probe the significant main effect of victim-
bystander status. Drawing on Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis, it was 
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predicted that, due to the aversive nature of victimization, victims would report higher overall 
anger than bystanders. The results of the ANOVAs revealed that, as predicted, victims reported 
significantly higher feelings of anger than bystanders, F(3, 288) = 22.28, p < .001, d = .55, 95% 
CI = [.32, .78]. Victims also had higher scores than bystanders for activation, F(3, 288) = 4.73, p 
= .030, d = .25, 95% CI = [.02, .49]; anxiety, F(3, 288) = 14.61, p = .001, d = .45, 95% CI = [.22, 
.68]; dejection, F(3, 288) = 7.35, p = .003, d = .32, 95% CI = [.09, .55]; and fatigue, F(3, 288) = 
5.77, p = .002, d = .28, 95% CI = [.05, .51]. Victims did not significantly differ from bystanders 
on the confusion subscale, F(3, 288) = .04, p = .831, d = .02, 95% CI = [–.21, .25]. These results 
indicate that the victim-bystander status manipulation was effective at increasing not only anger 
but also other forms of negative affect.  
Eyewitness Motivation Measures 
As a second manipulation check of the victim-bystander status manipulation, two 
separate analyses examined the effect of victim-bystander status on participants’ motivation to 
catch the guilty culprit. Higher aggression increases desire to resolve an aversive event. 
Therefore, I predicted that, due to a higher desire to resolve the cellphone theft via capture of the 
guilty culprit, victims would report being more motivated to catch the guilty culprit than 
bystanders. No a priori predictions were made regarding the effect of culprit presence on 
eyewitness motivations.  
First, using binary logistic regression, participants’ responses to the dichotomous 
motivation measure were regressed on victim-bystander status, culprit presence and the 
interaction between the two factors. Table 3 presents the frequencies, means and confidence 
intervals for the self-reported retrospective motivation measures. The results for this logistic 
regression analysis are presented in Table 4. Contrary to expectations, there was no main effect 
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for victim-bystander status on the dichotomous motivation measure, β = –.08, 95% CI = [–.35, 
.20], Wald’s 2(1) = .31, p = .580, OR = .93, 95% CI = [.71, 1.22]. In addition, there was no 
significant main effect of culprit presence, β = –.11, 95% CI = [–.16, .38], Wald’s 2(1) = .65, p 
= .422, OR = 1.12, 95% CI = [.85, 1.47], and no significant interaction between victim-bystander 
status and culprit presence, β = .24, 95% CI =  [–.04, .51], Wald’s 2(1) = 2.88, p = .090, OR = 
1.27, 95% CI = [.96, 1.66]. These results suggest that, when forced to choose between a 
motivation to avoid an innocent suspect and a motivation to catch the guilty culprit, neither 
victim-bystander status nor culprit presence significantly influenced self-reported motivation in 
victims. 
Next, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to examine the 
three remaining continuous motivation measures: motivation to catch the culprit, motivation to 
avoid an innocent suspect, and the combined measure with both motivations on a single scale. 
The results for this analysis are presented in Table 5. Victim-bystander status, culprit presence 
and the interaction between these two factors were entered as independent variables and 
participants’ mean scores on the three continuous motivation measures were entered as 
dependent variables. Contrary to my predictions, there was no significant main effect of victim-
bystander status on self-reported motivations, Wilk's Λ = .98, F(3, 286) = 1.57, p = .197, ηp2  = 
.02, 95% CI = [<.01, .05]. There was also no significant interaction between victim-bystander 
status and culprit presence, Wilk's Λ = .99, F(3, 286) = .66, p = .577, ηp2  = .01, 95% CI = [<.01, 
.03]. However, there was a significant main effect of culprit presence, Wilk's Λ = .96, F(3, 286) 
= 3.978, p = .008, ηp2  = .04, 95% CI = [<.01, .09].  
Post-hoc ANOVAs revealed that the overall main effect of culprit presence was driven by 
differences on the individual measures of motivation, with no significant main effect of culprit 
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presence on the combined motivation measure, F(1, 288) = 2.21, p = .138, Cohen’s d = .17, 95% 
CI = [–.06, .40]. Compared to participants in the culprit-present condition, participants in the 
culprit-absent condition reported being significantly more focused on avoiding an innocent 
suspect, F(1, 288) = 10.32, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .38, 95% CI = [.14, .61], and significantly less 
focused on catching the guilty culprit, F(1, 288) = 4.20, p = .041, Cohen’s d = .24, 95% CI = 
[.01, .47]. In other words, eyewitnesses who viewed a guilty culprit were more motivated to 
catch the guilty culprit, and eyewitnesses who viewed an innocent suspect were more motivated 
avoid an innocent suspect. Overall, these findings suggest that the victim-bystander status 
manipulation did not influence victims’ motivation to catch the guilty culprit.  
Primary Analyses 
The effects of victim-bystander status and culprit presence on eyewitness decision-
making were examined in three parts: effects on decision-making at identification, effects on 
post-identification judgments by eyewitnesses who aggressed by making a positive identification 
(i.e., identifiers), and anger as a potential mediator of the relationship between victim-bystander 
status and decision-making.  
Decision-Making at Identification 
Identification rates. Table 6 and Figure 1 present the identification rates across culprit 
presence and victim-bystander status. Eyewitnesses who were victims correctly identified the 
guilty culprit in 77.5% of cases and falsely identified an innocent suspect in 30.8% of cases. 
Eyewitnesses who were bystanders correctly identified the guilty culprit in 72.0% of cases and 
falsely identified an innocent suspect in 30.0% of cases. The following logistic regression results 
are presented in Table 7. To examine whether victim-bystander status influenced identification 
rates, eyewitnesses’ decision to identify was regressed on victim-bystander status, culprit 
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presence, and the interaction between the two factors, using binary logistic regression. Non-
identifications were coded as 0 and positive identifications were coded as 1.  
It was predicted that victims would make more positive identifications of both guilty 
culprits and innocent suspects than bystanders, resulting in a significant main effect of victim-
bystander status. It was also expected that participants who viewed a guilty culprit would make 
positive identifications more often than eyewitnesses who viewed an innocent suspect. A 
significant interaction between culprit presence and victim-bystander status would reflect that the 
victim-bystander status manipulation improved eyewitnesses’ ability to distinguish between 
guilty culprits and innocent suspects. Given that attention and encoding were eliminated as 
potential mediators and no differences were expected in victims’ and bystanders’ ability to 
retrieve the culprit’s face from memory, no prediction was made regarding the interaction 
between victim-bystander status and culprit presence.  
As expected, eyewitnesses presented with a guilty culprit were significantly more likely 
to make a positive identification than eyewitnesses presented with an innocent suspect, β = 1.92, 
95% CI = [1.41, 2.43], Wald’s 2(1) = 55.412, p < .001, OR = 6.82, 95% CI = [4.11, 11.31]. 
However, neither victim-bystander status, β = .164, 95% CI = [-.34, .67], Wald’s 2(1) = .406, p 
= .524, OR = 1.18, 95% CI = [.71, 1.95], nor the interaction between victim-bystander status and 
culprit presence, β = .256, 95% CI = [-.76, 1.27], Wald’s 2(1) = .246, p = .620, OR = 1.29, 95% 
CI = [.47, 3.55], significantly influenced identification rates. Overall, these results indicate that 
the victim-bystander manipulation did not significantly influence eyewitnesses’ identification 
rates or their ability to distinguish between culprits and innocent suspects. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis that victims would have higher identification rates than bystanders was not supported. 
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Signal detection measures. Although eyewitness performance in the current paper was 
primarily assessed via logistic regression of identification rates, several eyewitness researchers 
have advocated analysis of eyewitness performance using signal detection measures (Mickes, 
Moreland, Clark, & Wixted, 2014; Wixted & Mickes, 2012). Accordingly, a parallel analysis of 
eyewitness performance in the current study was conducted using the signal detection theory 
measures d’ and c. A summary of what these measures represent in eyewitness identification and 
how to calculate them is presented below. 
The signal detection measure d’ measures the ability of an eyewitness to distinguish 
between guilty culprits and an innocent suspects. It is calculated with the following equation:    
d’ = Φ-1(H) - Φ-1(FA), where  Φ-1 represents the standard normal inverse function, H represents 
the proportion of culprit identifications (i.e., hits) and FA represents the proportion of innocent 
suspect identifications (i.e., false alarms). Increasingly positive d’ values indicate a higher ratio 
of culprit to innocent suspect identifications. Compared to an analysis of identification rates 
using binary logistic regression, a significant difference in d’ between victims and bystanders is 
conceptually similar to a significant interaction between victim-bystander status and culprit 
presence.  
The signal detection measure c is a measure of response bias and represents an 
eyewitness’ willingness to make a positive identification. It is calculated with the following 
equation: c = -.5 × (Φ-1[C] + Φ-1[FA]). Negative values of c indicate a tendency toward making 
an identification and positive values of c indicate a bias toward making a rejection. Compared to 
an analysis of identification rates using binary logistic regression, a significant difference in c 
between victims and bystanders is conceptually similar to a significant main effect of victim-
bystander status on identification rates. 
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Signal detection measures are traditionally employed in repeated measures designs, 
which allow for the calculation of c and d’ for each individual participant across multiple trials. 
As eyewitness identification tasks typically require the use of between-subjects designs, point 
estimates of c and d’ must be calculated by collapsing across participants. To allow for an 
inferential comparison of c and d’ across experimental conditions, the variance around each 
statistic was estimated using non-parametric bootstrapping. Independent t-tests were then 
conducted to examine differences in c and d’ between victims and bystanders.  
Parallel to the prediction that victim-bystander status would evidence a significant main 
effect in the context of the logistic regression analysis, in the context of the signal detection 
analysis it was predicted that victims would adopt a more liberal response bias (c) than 
bystanders. No predictions were made regarding differences in discriminability (d’) between 
victims and bystanders; a significant difference in d’ would correspond to a significant 
interaction between victim-bystander status and culprit presence in the context of the logistic 
regression analysis. Victims had slightly better discriminability and slightly more liberal 
response bias (d’ = 1.257, c = -.127) than bystanders (d’ = 1.107, c = -.029). However, consistent 
with the findings using binary logistic regression, these differences in discriminability, t(301) = 
.48, p = .629, Cohen’s d = .028, 95% CI = [-.085, .140], and response bias, t(301) = 1.30, p = 
.195, Cohen’s d = .075, 95% CI = [-.038, .188], were non-significant.  
Immediate confidence judgments. Separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted to 
examine the effects of the manipulations on immediate confidence ratings for rejections and 
identifications. Table 8 presents the means and confidence intervals for immediate confidence 
ratings and response latency, organized by experimental effect. The results of the ANOVA 
analyses are presented in Table 9, organized by experimental effect and split by identification 
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decision. Drawing on the frustration-aggression hypothesis, it was predicted that victims who 
made a positive identification would report higher immediate confidence than bystanders who 
did not make an identification, in order to increase the effectiveness and potency of the positive 
identification and improve the likelihood that the cellphone theft would be resolved. No a priori 
predictions were made regarding the effect of victim-bystander status on confidence ratings for 
rejections, but analyses were conducted due to the importance of confidence as an outcome in 
eyewitness identification. 
Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences in immediate confidence 
judgments for identifications across culprit presence, F(1, 157) = 2.08, p = .151, Cohen’s d = .25, 
95% CI = [–.09, .60], victim-bystander status, F(1, 157) = 1.24, p = .268, Cohen’s d = .20, 95% 
CI = [–.15, .54], or the interaction between culprit presence and victim-bystander status, F(1, 
157) = 2.46, p = .119, Cohen’s d = .26, 95% CI [–.07, .59]. In addition, there were no significant 
differences in immediate confidence judgments for rejections across culprit presence, F(1, 138) = 
1.53, p = .218, Cohen’s d = .23, 95% CI = [–.14, .60], victim-bystander status, F(1, 138) = 2.47, 
p = .119, Cohen’s d = .30, 95% CI = [–.07, .67], or the interaction between culprit presence and 
victim-bystander status, F(1, 138) = .11, p = .738, Cohen’s d = .06, 95% CI [–.27, .38]. These 
findings suggest that, compared to bystanders, victims did not feel a need to increase the potency 
of their identification decision by bolstering their confidence ratings. In other words, the 
hypothesis that victims who made a positive identification would report higher immediate 
confidence than bystanders who made a positive identification was not supported. In addition, 
these data did not provide evidence of a confidence-accuracy relationship; this unexpected result 
is discussed further in the next chapter. 
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 Response Latency. As with the immediate confidence judgments, a two-way ANOVA 
was conducted to examine the effects of the manipulations on response latency for rejections and 
identifications. The results of the ANOVA analysis are presented in Table 9, organized by 
experimental effect. The distribution of response latency data in the current study exhibited 
significant positive skew. Therefore, response latency was log-transformed to meet assumptions 
of normality required for significance testing. In addition, three outliers were more than three 
standard deviations from the mean. To address this issue, the outliers were recoded to be 3 
standard deviations above the mean, and the data were analyzed both with and without the 
recoded outliers. The results were nearly identical when outliers were discarded or kept in the 
analysis. Accordingly, the following section only presents results with the recoded outliers 
included in the dataset. 
It was predicted that victims who made a positive identification would take less time to 
make an identification than bystanders. However, there were no significant differences in 
response latency for identifications across culprit presence, F(1, 155) = .04, p = .956, Cohen’s d 
= .04, 95% CI = [–.31, .38], victim-bystander status, F(1, 155) = 2.92, p = .093, Cohen’s d = .27, 
95% CI = [–.04, .59], or the interaction between culprit presence and victim-bystander status, 
F(1, 155) < .01, p = .929, Cohen’s d = .01, 95% CI [–.31, .32]. The lack of a significant main 
effect for victim-bystander status indicates a failure to support the hypothesis that victims would 
take less time than bystanders to identify the guilty culprit. 
Post-Identification Judgments by Identifiers  
 This next section examines the effect of victim-bystander status on bolstering of post-
identification judgments by eyewitnesses who made a positive identification in the showup 
procedure. By limiting analyses to eyewitnesses who made a positive identification, this section 
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focuses on post-identification decision-making in only those eyewitnesses who aggressed by 
making a positive identification. Importantly, all post-identification judgments were made by 
eyewitnesses under the belief that they were reporting their judgments of the event and the 
showup procedure to campus law enforcement. In terms of the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
(Berkowitz, 1989), bolstering on post-identification judgments reflects an increase in the potency 
of eyewitnesses’ aggression via a positive identification. This increase in potency serves to 
increase the likelihood that law enforcement perceive victims’ identification as valid and 
reliable, thereby improving the odds that the aversive event (i.e., the cellphone theft) is resolved 
via capture of the guilty culprit. Therefore, for all post-identification judgments, it was predicted 
that victims would bolster their responses compared to bystanders. 
Examination of post-identification judgments is separated into two sections. The first 
section examines judgments regarding eyewitnesses’ perceived ability to accurately identify the 
guilty culprit leading up to the showup procedure, whereas the second section examines 
eyewitnesses’ perceived certainty that they accurately identified the guilty culprit during the 
showup procedure. The final section examines eyewitnesses’ self-reported willingness to testify 
in court about their decision to identify. Tables 10 and 11 present the means and confidence 
intervals for the post-identification judgments of ability to identify, certainty in identification 
decision, and willingness to testify in court by eyewitnesses who made a positive identification. 
Judgments of ability to identify the culprit. A MANOVA was conducted to examine 
the effects of culprit presence and victim-bystander status on eyewitnesses’ self-perceived view 
of the culprit, self-perceived ability to make out specific features of the culprit’s face, self- 
perceived attention paid to the culprit’s face, self-perceived clarity of the image of the culprit’s 
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face, and self-perceived recognition memory for strangers’ faces. Table 12 presents the 
MANOVA results for these five post-identification judgments, organized by experimental effect. 
 Although there was no significant main effect of victim-bystander status on post-
identification judgments of ability to identify the culprit, Wilk's Λ = .949, F(5, 148) = 1.60, p = 
.163, ηp2  = .05, 95% CI = [<.01, .10], there was a significant interaction between victim-
bystander status and culprit presence, Wilk's Λ = .925, F(5, 148) = 2.39, p = .040, ηp2  = .07, 95% 
CI = [<.01, .14], such that victims who viewed an innocent suspect gave significantly higher 
ratings on the post-identification judgments of ability to identify the culprit than bystanders who 
viewed an innocent suspect. In addition, there was a significant main effect of culprit presence, 
Wilk's Λ = .917, F(5, 148) = 2.68, p = .024, ηp2  = .08, 95% CI = [<.01, .15], such that 
participants who viewed a culprit gave significantly higher ratings on the post-identification 
judgments of ability than participants who viewed an innocent suspect. 
Post-hoc ANOVAs revealed one significant main effect of culprit presence, two 
significant main effects of victim-bystander status and one significant interaction between culprit 
presence and victim-bystander status. Participants who viewed a culprit reported having a 
significantly better view of the culprit than participants who viewed an innocent suspect, F(1, 
152) = 7.01, p = .009, Cohen’s d = .47, 95% CI = [.12, .82]. Compared to bystanders, victims 
reporting paying significantly more attention, F(1, 152) = 4.12, p = .044, Cohen’s d = .33, 95% 
CI = [.01, .64], and having a significantly clearer mental image of the culprit, F(1, 152) = 5.22, p 
= .024, Cohen’s d = .37, 95% CI = [.05, .69]. Finally, there was a significant interaction between 
culprit presence and victim-bystander status for number of specific facial features recalled, F(1, 
152) = 6.30, p = .013, Cohen’s d = .40, 95% CI = [.08, .72]. I first explored this interaction by 
examining simple main effects of victim-bystander status on the number of specific facial 
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features recalled. When the participants viewed an innocent suspect, victims reported paying 
significantly more attention than bystanders, t(155) = 2.46, p = .015, Cohen’s d = .40, 95% CI = 
[.08, .71]. However, there was no significant simple main effect of victim-bystander status on 
perceived number of specific facial features recalled when participants viewed a guilty culprit, 
t(155) = –.81, p = .421, Cohen’s d = .13, 95% CI = [–.19, .45]. These findings suggest that 
victims’ bolstering of perceived specific facial features recalled may be strongest in cases where 
the victim identified an innocent suspect. Overall, these findings provide partial support for the 
hypothesis that victims would bolster judgments of their ability to accurately identify the guilty 
culprit compared to bystanders.  
Next, I examined the simple main effects for culprit presence on the perceived number of 
specific facial features recalled. When participants were victims, participants who viewed an 
innocent suspect significantly differed from participants who viewed a culprit in perceived 
number of specific facial features recalled, t(155) = 2.68, p = .008, Cohen’s d = .47, 95% CI = 
[.12, .83]. However, when participants were bystanders, participants who viewed an innocent 
suspect did not significantly differ from participants who viewed a culprit in perceived number 
of specific facial features recalled, t(155) = –.80, p = .426, Cohen’s d = .14, 95% CI = [–.21, 
.49]. These results suggest one of two possibilities: either viewing an innocent suspect has a 
stronger impact on perceived number of specific facial features recalled when participants are 
bystanders, or being a victim reduces the impact of culprit presence on perceived number of 
specific facial features recalled.  
Judgments of certainty in identification decision. As with the judgments of ability to 
identify the culprit, a MANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of culprit presence and 
victim-bystander status on eyewitnesses’ delayed confidence ratings, perceived basis to make an 
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identification, perceived ease of identification, and perceived time needed to make identification. 
Table 13 presents the MANOVA results for these four post-identification judgments, organized 
by experimental effect.  
Contrary to predictions, there were no significant main effect of victim-bystander status 
on post-identification judgments of ability to identify the culprit, Wilk's Λ = .977, F(4, 149) = 
.89, p = .475, ηp2  = .02, 95% CI = [<.01, .06]. In addition, there was no significant main effect of 
culprit presence, Wilk's Λ = .940, F(4, 149) = 2.37, p = .056, ηp2  = .06, 95% CI = [<.01, .12], 
and no significant interaction between victim-bystander status and culprit presence, Wilk's Λ = 
.984, F(4, 149) = .81, p = .657, ηp2  = .02 95% CI = [<.01, .06]. Due to the lack of significant 
main effects or a significant interaction, no post-hoc analyses of the individual post-identification 
judgments of certainty were conducted. Overall, these results indicate a lack of support for the 
hypothesis that victim-bystander status would lead to bolstering of post-identification judgments 
of certainty in participants’ identifications. 
Willingness to testify in court. Finally, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine 
the effects of culprit presence and victim-bystander status on eyewitnesses’ willingness to testify 
in court that the person they identified was the culprit. Table 14 presents the following ANOVA 
results, organized by experimental effect. As predicted, there was a significant main effect of 
victim-bystander status on willingness to testify, F(1, 152) = 10.31, p = .002, Cohen’s d = .52, 
95% CI = [.20, .84], such that victims reported being significantly more willing than bystanders 
to testify in court about their decision to identify. There was no significant main effect of culprit 
presence, F(1, 152) = 1.83, p = .179, Cohen’s d = .24, 95% CI = [–.11, .59], and no significant 
interaction between culprit presence and victim-bystander status, F(1, 152) = 2.96, p = .087, 
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Cohen’s d = .28, 95% CI = [–.04, .59]. These results provide support for the hypothesis that 
victims would bolster their post-identification judgment of willingness to testify in court. 
Anger as a Mediator of Post-Identification Judgments 
This next section provides an empirical test of the applicability of Berkowitz’s (1989) 
frustration-aggression hypothesis to the relationship between victim-bystander status and 
eyewitness decision-making. Under the frustration-aggression hypothesis, aggressive tendencies 
are mediated by negative affect, and by feelings of anger in particular. If victim-bystander status 
increases eyewitness aggression in the manner predicted by Berkowitz’s frustration-aggression 
hypothesis, its effect on eyewitness decision-making should be mediated by increased feelings of 
anger in victims compared to bystanders. Although the frustration-aggression hypothesis allows 
for other forms of negative affect to increase aggression, anger is considered to be the strongest 
mediator (1989). Therefore, mediation analyses were limited to effects of victim-bystander status 
through the potential mediator of anger. In addition, there was no significant effect of victim-
bystander status on the other predicted mediator of motivation to catch the guilty culprit. 
Accordingly, no analyses examining motivation to catch the guilty culprit as a mediator of 
victim-bystander status were conducted. 
Generally, it is only appropriate to examine mediation in the presence of a total effect. 
However, victim-bystander status only significantly influenced four outcomes in this study: 
attention paid to the culprit, number of specific facial features of the culprit attended to, clarity of 
mental image of the culprit’s face, and willingness to testify in court. Accordingly, mediation 
testing was limited to just these fours outcomes. Because analysis of post-identification 
judgments was limited to only participants who chose to aggress via a positive identification, the 
following mediation analyses were also constrained to identifiers. The indirect effects of victim-
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bystander status on these four outcomes through the proposed mediator of anger was assessed 
using the Preacher & Hayes bootstrap procedure. Per the Preacher and Hayes (2013) guidelines 
for testing mediation with multiple independent variables, victim-bystander status was entered as 
the primary independent variable while culprit presence and the interaction between victim-
bystander status and culprit presence were entered as covariates. Anger was entered into the 
model as the mediator.  
Tables 15 through 18 present the mediation effects of anger for victim-bystander status 
on each of the four post-identification judgments. Of these four post-identification judgments, 
only attention paid to the culprit was significantly mediated by anger. The indirect effect on 
attention paid to the culprit was estimated to be .165 (Bias-Corrected 95% CI = 0.032, .406). 
Given that the bias-corrected confidence intervals do not overlap zero, one can infer that the 
indirect effect is statistically significant (p < .05). This result provides support for the hypothesis 
that victim-bystander status’s effect on attention paid to the culprit would be significantly 
mediated by anger. However, the absence of mediation for the other three post-identification 
outcomes means that this finding provides only partial support for the eyewitness aggression 
model predicted by the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Berkowitz, 1989). 
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
 
This study tested whether eyewitnesses' status as either a victim or a bystander influenced 
their decision-making processes in a showup procedure after eliminating attention and encoding 
as possible mediators of the victim-bystander status manipulation. Overall, the results of this 
study indicate that victim-bystander status has a negligible impact on eyewitness decision-
making during a showup procedure but influenced eyewitnesses’ perceived ability to identify the 
culprit and eyewitnesses’ willingness to testify in court. Participants who were victims of a 
cellphone theft were not significantly more likely to identify a suspect during a showup 
procedure than participants who were bystanders to the theft. In addition, victims did not 
significantly differ from bystanders in their ability to distinguish guilty culprits from innocent 
suspects. Finally, victims did not significantly differ from bystanders in immediate confidence 
ratings, response latency, or motivation to catch the guilty culprit.  
However, there were several notable findings related to victim-bystander status in this 
study. First, as predicted, victims reported experiencing significantly higher anger than 
bystanders at the time that they learned a cellphone theft had occurred. Victims also reported 
experiencing greater activation, anxiety, dejection, and fatigue than bystanders. Second, victims 
who viewed an innocent suspect gave significantly higher ratings of their post-identification 
ability to identify the culprit than bystanders. Specifically, victims who made a positive 
identification bolstered their responses to four post-identification judgments: how much attention 
eyewitnesses paid to the culprit’s face, how well eyewitnesses could make out specific features 
of the culprit’s face, how clear an image eyewitnesses retained of the culprit. Finally, victims 
reported being significantly more willing to testify in court about their identification decision 
47 
than bystanders. The following section discusses the theoretical implications of these findings in 
relation to Berkowitz’s (1989) revised frustration-aggression hypothesis. 
Aggression, Victim-Bystander Status, and Eyewitness Decision-Making 
Drawing on Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis, it was predicted that, 
compared to bystanders, victims would experience greater anger and have a greater desire to 
resolve the aversive event, and that these factors would lead to victims having a higher tendency 
to aggress than bystanders. This tendency to aggress was predicted to manifest at the time of the 
identification procedure in the form of identification rates, with victims predicted to make more 
positive identifications than bystanders. It also was predicted that—due to a higher desire to 
resolve the aversive event—victims would increase the potency of positive identifications by 
reporting higher immediate confidence and identifying culprits and innocent suspects faster than 
bystanders. Finally, it was predicted that, compared to bystanders, victims would increase the 
potency of positive identifications by bolstering their post-identification judgments of ability to 
identify, certainty in their identification, and willingness to testify in court. Bolstering by victims 
on these judgments would give law enforcement a better impression of victims’ ability to make 
an accurate identification of the guilty culprit and improve the odds that the cellphone theft 
would be resolved, thereby increasing the potency of victims’ decision to identify. The 
theoretical implications and findings for each of these predictions are discussed below. 
Negative affect. Consistent with the frustration-aggression hypothesis, victims reported 
experiencing greater anger than bystanders. However, it is important to note that the victim-
bystander manipulation also had small to moderate effects on activation, anxiety, dejection, and 
fatigue. These findings are consistent with Berkowitz’s (1989) revised formulation of the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis. Although the revised hypothesis highlights anger as the 
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primary emotion driving aggression, it does not preclude effects of the aversive event on other 
components of negative affect. Overall, these findings suggest that the cellphone theft was 
sufficiently aversive to trigger an increase in negative affect among victims, consistent with the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis’ assumption that aversive events are particularly frustrating 
when perceived as a deliberate personal attack (Berkowitz, 1989). Future studies should address 
whether these other aspects of negative affect have unique contributions to eyewitness decision-
making. 
Desire to resolve the aversive event. Desire to resolve the aversive event was assessed 
indirectly in this study via retrospective motivation to catch the guilty culprit. However, victims 
did not significantly differ from bystanders on any of the four measures examining eyewitness 
motivations to catch the guilty culprit or avoid an innocent suspect. These results tentatively 
suggest that victim-bystander status has a negligible effect on eyewitnesses’ retrospective 
motivations at the time of the identification.  
In terms of Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis, these findings suggest 
that victims did not have a higher desire to resolve the aversive event than bystanders. One 
potential explanation for these results is that the social norms associated with identification 
procedures caused both victims and bystanders to be equally motivated to resolve the aversive 
event. As noted in the introduction, Berkowitz (1989) highlighted social norms as one factor that 
could prohibit aggressive behavior in response to an aversive event. In this instance, it is possible 
that eyewitnesses considered innocent suspects to be unacceptable targets for aggression via a 
positive identification, leading them to focus on being accurate rather than on catching the guilty 
culprit.  
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It is also possible that the retrospective motivation measures used here failed to capture 
the effects of victim-bystander status on motivation at the time of the identification. In this 
paradigm, retrospective motivations were always assessed at the end of the experiment in order 
to prevent participants’ responses to manipulation check questions influencing their decision-
making and responses at other points in the study. This decision to delay measuring 
eyewitnesses’ motivation until the end of the procedures was made to protect the internal validity 
of this study with respect to the primary outcome of identification rates.  
However, this decision to delay the measurement of retrospective motivations raises the 
possibility that the culprit presence manipulation and other post-identification measures occluded 
the effect of victim-bystander status on eyewitnesses’ actual motivations at the time of the 
identification. That is, victims may have felt a higher desire to resolve the aversive event than 
bystanders at the time of the identification, and therefore may have reported a higher motivation 
to catch the guilty culprit, if their motivations were assessed during or prior to the showup 
procedure. Future studies could address this possibility by measuring motivation immediately 
prior to the identification procedure. However, it is important to note that doing so could 
influence subsequent decision-making, including identification performance. 
Decision-making at identification. The primary hypothesis of this study—that victims 
would have higher identification rates than bystanders—was not supported. Indeed, victim-
bystander status did not affect any of the decision-making outcomes measured during the 
showup procedure: That is, victims did not significantly differ from bystanders in identification 
rates, immediate confidence ratings, or response latency. Overall, these results suggest that if 
victimization did increase eyewitnesses’ tendency to aggress, this tendency did not manifest as 
differential decision-making during the showup procedure. This suggests that, when attention 
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and encoding are eliminated as potential mediators, victim-bystander status only has a negligible 
effect on eyewitness decision-making at the time of an identification procedure. 
However, the lack of a relationship between confidence ratings and culprit presence is 
worth noting, as these findings are contrary to the wealth of research demonstrating a robust 
confidence-accuracy relationship (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Lindsay, Kalmet, Leung, Bertrand, 
Sauer, & Sauerland, 2013; Palmer, Brewer & Weber, 2013; Sporer, Penrod, Read, Cutler & 
Steinberg, 1995; Wixted & Wells, 2017). There are three potential factors that contributed to the 
weak confidence-accuracy relationship in these data. First, this study employed showups rather 
than lineups. Second, the nature of the cover story in this paradigm precluded the experimenters 
from being double-blind. Finally, to maintain low suspicion prior to the post-identification 
measures, experimenters verbally and informally asked participants to give a rating of 
confidence in their identification decision on a scale ranging from 1 to 10, rather than on a 
formal 0 to 100% scale.  
Prior research has demonstrated that the confidence-accuracy relationship is greatest 
when using pristine identification procedures (Wixted & Wells, 2017), such as unbiased lineups 
and double-blind administration. Due to their suggestive nature and the lack of fillers as 
distractors, showups have been conceptualized as being an extreme form of a biased lineup 
(Smith et al., 2017). In addition, the informal presentation of the confidence ratings may have 
reduced the reliability of the measure compared to previous research. It therefore possible that 
the methodology in this paradigm resulted in the absence of a confidence-accuracy relationship. 
However, further research will need to be conducted to test the exact mechanisms that caused the 
absence of a confidence-accuracy relationship in these data. 
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Post-identification judgments. However, this does not mean that victim-bystander 
status had no effect on eyewitness decision-making in this study. When presented with an 
innocent suspect, victims who made a positive identification bolstered their post-identification 
judgments of ability to make an identification. In addition, victims were significantly more 
willing to testify in court than bystanders, regardless of whether they saw a culprit or innocent 
suspect. In terms of the individual judgments of ability to identify, victims bolstered their 
responses to three of the five items: how much attention eyewitnesses paid to the culprit’s face, 
how well eyewitnesses could make out specific features of the culprit’s face, and how clear an 
image eyewitnesses retained of the culprit. These findings suggest that victims who aggressed 
via a positive identification also increased the potency of their aggressive act by inflating their 
self-reported ability to identify the culprit. Given that participants believed their responses were 
part of a real police report and would be sent to law enforcement, it is possible that victims’ 
bolstering of these post-identification judgments was caused by a desire to convince law 
enforcement that their identification was accurate. In doing so, victims would improve the odds 
that law enforcement followed up on their positive identification and captured the guilty culprit, 
resulting in resolution of the aversive event. 
Notably, willingness to testify is the only item on the list of post-identification judgments 
influenced by victim-bystander status that is not related to eyewitnesses’ ability to identify the 
culprit or certainty in their identification decision. Instead, the significant differences between 
victims and bystanders in willingness to testify may reflect a difference in future intentions. In 
terms of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, this suggests that victimization may affect 
eyewitnesses’ future intention to aggress via other channels of behavior. After all, if one 
considers a positive identification of a suspect to be an aggressive act due to its potential 
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negative consequences for said suspect, then direct testimony in court about the guilt of that 
suspect should also be theoretically conceptualized as an act of aggression by eyewitnesses. 
Future studies could examine this possibility by asking victims and bystanders about their 
intention to make a positive identification prior to presenting them with an identification 
procedure. 
These findings are also notable because, due to the victim-bystander manipulation being 
delayed until immediately prior to the showup procedure, all eyewitnesses in this study had the 
same quality of attention and encoding. Due to random assignment, victims’ bolstered post-
identification judgments are unlikely to reflect true differences between victims and bystanders 
in attention to and encoding of the culprit’s face. Therefore, victims’ bolstering of post-
identification judgments can be attributed to victimization and its corresponding psychological 
effects. The implications of these results for eyewitness testimony are concerning. They suggest 
that victims may give the appearance of having a greater ability to accurately identify guilty 
culprits than bystanders, even in the absence of true differences. Indeed, bolstering on two of the 
judgments (attention paid to the culprit and ability to make out specific facial features) was most 
potent when victims had identified an innocent suspect.  
One potential explanation for victims’ tendency to bolster following false alarms lies in 
cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance theory proposes that one feels tension when 
two simultaneously accessible cognitions are inconsistent and that this tension leads to the 
adoption of attitudes that justify one’s actions (Cooper, 2007). In this instance, victims who 
identified an innocent suspect may have felt tension between wanting to “get back” at the culprit 
and wanting to be an accurate witness and a good citizen. This tension, combined with a 
suspicion that they identified an innocent person, may have led victims to bolster their responses 
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to the post-identification judgments in order to justify their positive identification to not only the 
police, but to themselves. However, this possibility also has troubling implications for the justice 
system, as it suggests that the tendency for victims to exaggerate their ability to have made an 
accurate identification may be highest when their testimony could implicate an innocent suspect. 
Furthermore, it is possible that victims’ bolstering of post-identification judgments could 
become more potent over time. Previous research has demonstrated that confirming post-
identification feedback leads eyewitnesses to inflate estimates of confidence in their 
identification decision (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014). It is possible that this effect may 
occur in other types of post-identification judgments, including the judgments influenced by 
victim-bystander status in this study. Even in the absence of confirmatory behavior at the time of 
the identification procedure, eyewitnesses who testify are nearly guaranteed to experience 
confirmatory feedback. Indeed, even the act of requesting that an eyewitness testify about her or 
his identification implies that the identification led to the capture of the guilty culprit (Eisen et 
al., 2018). Accordingly, additional studies are needed to examine the extent to which victims 
bolster their post-identification judgments and to determine whether interventions can counteract 
victims’ bolstering of post-identification judgments. 
Despite these noteworthy findings, the lack of significant differences between victims 
and bystanders on the goodness of view and self-perceived recognition memory ability items 
suggest that the effects of victim-bystander status on post-identification judgments requires 
further qualification. One potential explanation for these conflicting findings concerns the 
relevancy of the items to eyewitnesses’ memory of the criminal event. Specific facial features 
made out, attention paid to the culprit, and clarity of one’s image of the culprit’s face are all 
items related to eyewitnesses’ memory for the culprit’s face. In other words, these items were 
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directly relevant to the criminal event. Self-perceived recognition memory ability, on the other 
hand, focuses on participants’ self-concept, rather than on an aspect of the situation. However, 
this explanation does not account for the lack of differences in the goodness of view item, as at 
face value this item appears directly relevant to the criminal event. Therefore, exploration of 
these effects requires further testing.  
Implications for victim-bystander status and aggression. These findings provide 
partial support for victim-bystander status influencing some eyewitness decision-making 
processes in the manner predicted by Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis. 
However, not all victims’ bolstered post-identification judgments were mediated by anger, as one 
would expect given the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Instead, only the effect of victim-
bystander status on attention paid to the culprit was mediated by feelings of anger. In addition, 
further testing of desire to resolve the aversive event as a mediator was not feasible due to the 
lack of a relationship between victim-bystander status and motivation to catch the guilty culprit. 
It is worth noting that the lack of the predicted mediation may have been caused by the decision 
to delay measurement of retrospective mood and motivation until the end of the procedures. 
Measuring negative affect and eyewitness motivations after the victim-bystander status 
manipulation and prior to the identification procedure may provide a more accurate assessment 
of mediational processes. Given the current data, however, it appears that the frustration-
aggression hypothesis has limited utility in explaining the effects of victim-bystander status on 
eyewitness decision-making. 
It is also possible that victim-bystander status does increase aggressive tendencies, but 
that this increase in tendency to aggress has a limited influence on eyewitness decision-making 
processes. In other words, victim-bystander status may lead to an increase in aggression that can 
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be detected via other behavioral outcomes (e.g., the hot sauce paradigm, Lieberman et al., 1999) 
while at the same time having a negligible impact on eyewitness identification outcomes. Future 
studies could test this hypothesis by examining the impact of victim-bystander using more 
traditional aggression paradigms.  
Another possible explanation for these results is that eyewitnesses were more concerned 
with accuracy than aggressing against the perpetrator during the identification procedure. As 
noted in Berkowitz’s revised (1989) frustration-aggression hypothesis, frustrations do not always 
lead to overt aggression. Social norms, inhibitions, prior learning, and intervening cognitive 
processes can curtail aggressive reactions, even when an aversive event is frustrating and 
produces anger. In this study, eyewitnesses presented with the showup procedure may have 
considered making an accurate identification of the culprit to be a higher priority than “getting 
back” at the culprit who stole their phone by making a positive identification. To be accurate, an 
eyewitness must consider the consequences of both misses and false alarms. Therefore, it is 
possible that eyewitnesses discerned that falsely identifying an innocent suspect would not lead 
to the resolution of the aversive event. In other words, despite victims experiencing greater anger 
than bystanders in response to the aversive event, victims’ tendency to aggress by making a 
positive identification may have been curtailed by their desire to make an overall accurate 
identification.  
Culprit Presence and Eyewitnesses Decision-Making 
 The following section discusses several effects of the culprit presence manipulation on 
eyewitnesses’ retrospective judgments and motivations. No a priori predictions were made 
regarding the influence of culprit presence on post-identification judgments or retrospective 
motivations. However, these differences are not unexpected, given that prior research has 
56 
demonstrated effects of culprit presence on post-identification judgments (Bradfield & Wells, 
2000; Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002). 
Post-identification judgments. Culprit presence had a significant impact on participants’ 
post-identification judgments of ability to identify, such that participants who viewed a culprit 
reported having a significantly better view of the culprit during the criminal event than 
participants who viewed an innocent suspect. Although culprit presence did not significantly 
impact participants’ overall post-identification judgments of certainty, participants who viewed a 
culprit reported significantly greater ease of identification and reported needing significantly less 
time to make an identification. Notably, these judgments of perceived decision-making 
performance were diagnostic of actual decision-making performance in these data, in that higher 
ratings on post-identification judgments were associated with more hits than false alarms. 
Therefore, at first glance, these results suggest that eyewitnesses had some insight into the 
accuracy of their decision-making performance. 
However, it is important to consider why culprit presence influenced these judgments and 
whether the effects of culprit presence are consistent with eyewitnesses’ actual behavior and the 
true viewing conditions. The greater perceived ease of identification in participants who viewed 
a guilty culprit can potentially be attributed to ecphoric experience, a subjective sense of 
similarity between a stimulus and a person’s memory (Charman & Wells, 2012). Research in this 
area has demonstrated that eyewitnesses feel a stronger ecphoric experience when shown the 
actual culprit than when shown an innocent suspect and that this feeling of ecphoric experience 
provides a cue that improves recall of the culprit’s face and leads to higher identification 
accuracy (Charman & Wells, 2012). Therefore, the higher ratings for ease of identification by 
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participants who identified a guilty culprit are understandable, as these ratings may simply reflect 
greater ease in retrieval of the culprit’s face from memory.  
However, the effects of culprit presence on perceived time to identification and perceived 
viewing conditions beg a more complex explanation. Indeed, earlier analyses of decision-making 
at identification indicated that there were no significant differences in response latency as a 
function of culprit presence. In other words, participants in the culprit present condition bolstered 
their judgments of perceived response latency in the bogus campus theft report, and these 
bolstered judgments were inconsistent with eyewitnesses’ actual response latency at the time of 
the showup procedure. It is possible, however, that participants’ perceived response latency is a 
more accurate measure of the time that they needed to make an identification. The response 
latency measure used to assess participants’ actual time to identification during the showup 
procedure may have been too unreliable to detect real differences based on culprit presence. 
However, it is improbable that participants in the culprit presence condition had a 
significantly better view of the culprit than participants in the culprit absent condition. The 
culprit presence manipulation occurred during the showup procedure and, due to random 
assignment, participants who viewed a guilty culprit during the showup procedure had the same 
level of attention to and encoding of the guilty culprit as participants who viewed an innocent 
suspect. In other words, the perceived differences in viewing conditions as a function of culprit 
presence are inconsistent with the true viewing conditions in this study. 
One possible explanation for this inconsistency lies in the selective cue integration 
framework (Charman, Carlucci, Vallano, & Hyman Gregory, 2010). This framework suggests 
that eyewitnesses have little or no memory trace for their decision-making performance at the 
time of identification and must therefore infer their performance based on any available 
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information. Accordingly, the culprit presence manipulation may have unintentionally generated 
cues that are diagnostic of accuracy, such as ecphoric experience or perceived ease of 
identification. Eyewitnesses may have then used these cues to inform their post-identification 
judgments, resulting in judgments that imply diagnosticity but are, in fact, artifacts of the culprit 
presence manipulation.  
One might argue that these effects are benign. After all, exaggerated eyewitness 
testimony is still a useful tool if it is always an indicator of accuracy. However, ecphoric 
experience does not only occur when a guilty culprit is present. It instead exists on a continuum: 
The more similar an innocent suspect is to the guilty culprit, the stronger the ecphoric experience 
will be (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002; Charman & Wells, 2012). In the real world, one can 
never know if a strong ecphoric experience is caused by the presence of the guilty culprit or a 
highly similar innocent suspect. Therefore, eyewitnesses relying on cues from the identification 
procedure to inform their post-identification judgments may produce misleading testimony, 
which may result in wrongful convictions if taken at face value. 
Retrospective motivations. Culprit presence also influenced retrospective reports of 
motivation during the showup procedure. Compared to participants who saw an innocent suspect, 
participants who saw a guilty culprit reported being significantly more focused on catching the 
culprit and significantly less focused on avoiding an innocent suspect. As with the retrospective 
judgments, it is possible that the culprit presence manipulation may have created cues in the form 
of ecphoric experience or ease of identification, and that eyewitnesses may have used these cues 
to infer their motivation at the time of the showup procedure (Charman et al., 2010; Charman & 
Wells, 2012). However, given that the motivation measures were assessed at the end of the 
study, it is impossible to know whether these retrospective motivations match the true 
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motivations that eyewitnesses experienced going into the showup procedure. Future studies 
could address this issue by measuring eyewitnesses’ motivations prior to an identification 
procedure.  
With that said, there were no significant main effects for culprit presence on the 
dichotomous motivation measure or on the combined motivation measure. It is possible, 
however, that the lack of differences on these two measures can be explained by properties of the 
items. Dichotomizing items reduces statistical power to detect relations between independent and 
dependent variables (Altman & Royston, 2006). Therefore, the dichotomous eyewitness 
motivation measure used here may have been too underpowered to detect any effects of culprit 
presence on eyewitness motivations, whereas the continuous measures had sufficient power to 
detect these effects. 
In addition, combining eyewitnesses’ motivation to catch the guilty culprit and avoid an 
innocent suspect into a single scale on the combined motivation measure may have been 
inappropriate. Doing so assumes that these two motivations are similar constructs that exist on 
the same continuum. However, examination of the correlation between the independent “catch 
guilty culprit” and “avoid innocent suspect” motivation measures revealed only a moderate 
relationship between the two items (r = -.38). This provides some evidence that motivation to 
avoid an innocent suspect is a separate construct from motivation to catch the guilty culprit and 
suggests that these two motivations should not be assessed on the same scale. However, direct 
examination of this hypothesis is needed before definitive conclusions can be reached. 
Furthermore, given that the effect of culprit presence on eyewitness motivations was not the 
subject of this study, one should be cautious in interpreting any of these findings. 
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Limitations 
 There are four limitations of this study that should be addressed in future examinations of 
victim-bystander status and eyewitness decision-making. The first limitation is that the culprit 
presence manipulation may have occluded the effect of victim-bystander status on eyewitnesses’ 
post-identification judgments and retrospective motivations. As noted earlier, culprit presence 
significantly influenced eyewitnesses’ motivations and identifiers’ perceived decision-making 
performance and their perceived view of the culprit. It is possible that the differential difficulty 
in the culprit-present and culprit-absent showup tasks was more salient to participants than the 
victim-bystander manipulation. This may have resulted in underestimates of the effects of 
victim-bystander status on post-identification judgments. In addition, eyewitnesses’ motivations 
were always assessed at the end of the experiment, in order to prevent participants’ responses to 
manipulation check questions influencing their decision-making and responses at other points in 
the study. This decision to delay measuring eyewitnesses’ motivation until the end of the 
procedures was made to protect the internal validity of this study with respect to the primary 
outcome of identification rates. However, doing so may have resulted in the culprit presence 
manipulation and other post-identification measures reducing the effect of victim-bystander 
status. Future studies may consider measuring eyewitness motivations earlier in the procedures, 
as doing so may reveal more differences in motivations between victims and bystanders. 
A second limitation of this study is that the effect of victim-bystander status may have 
been weakened by the high likeability and friendliness of the confederate partners. Results from 
the partner rating survey, administered prior to the victim-bystander manipulation, indicate that 
participants generally viewed their partners as extremely friendly and likeable. However, the 
means and distribution of responses on these items were extremely close to the maximum rating 
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of 5, creating a ceiling effect. It is therefore possible that bystanders in this study experienced 
high empathy for their victimized partners and were victimized by proxy. In other words, 
bystanders may have been just as motivated as victims to catch the guilty culprit, because they 
could vividly imagine the theft happening to them. In other words, true differences may exist 
between victims and bystanders, but only when bystanders have a less amiable relationship with 
their partners.  
Due to the ceiling effect and the lack of variance among responses in the current sample, 
it was not feasible to test whether perceived friendliness and likeability mediated the relationship 
between victim-bystander status and identification rates. To address this limitation, follow-up 
studies should examine whether manipulating likeability and friendliness of the confederate 
partner moderates the impact of victim-bystander status on identification rates. Alternatively, 
future studies could consider using a non-person entity as a “victim”, such as the federal 
government or a university. Doing so could help address the issue of bystanders experiencing 
victimization by proxy and could reveal differences in victims’ decision-making that cannot be 
accounted for here. 
A third limitation of this study concerns the timing of the victim-bystander manipulation. 
Although the victim-bystander status manipulation was intentionally delayed to eliminate 
attention and encoding as possible mediators, it is possible that victims could significantly differ 
from bystanders in both the amount of attention paid to the culprit and quality of encoding for 
the culprit’s face. Given that victims experienced greater negative affect than bystanders, there is 
also theoretical reason to believe that victims would be less accurate than bystanders in an 
identification procedure. Prior research has shown that eyewitnesses who experience negative 
affect during a criminal event are less able to recognize a perpetrator from a photographic lineup 
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than eyewitnesses who experience neutral affect (Houston, Clifford, Phillips, & Memon, 2013). 
The lack of significant differences in victims’ and bystanders’ ability to distinguish between 
guilty culprits and innocent suspects in the current paradigm suggest that this detrimental effect 
of negative emotion may be negligible when attention and encoding are removed as potential 
mediators of the victim-bystander status manipulation. However, examining the full impact of 
victim-bystander status on recognition performance will require that participants be aware of 
their victim-bystander status at the same time that they observe the culprit and crime. Doing so 
will allow for examination of the effect of victim-bystander status on attention and encoding 
processes, which could result in differential performance during the showup procedure.  
A final limitation of this study is that its findings can only be generalized to decision-
making in showups, despite lineups being the most frequently-used identification procedure in 
the United States (Police Executive Research Forum, 2013). It should be noted that the decision 
to use showups in this study rather than lineups was a conscious one. In showups, eyewitnesses 
are presented with a single suspect and can either make an identification or reject the showup. 
This means that in showups, positive identifications map onto hits (in the culprit-present 
condition) and false alarms (in the culprit-absent condition). In lineups, however, eyewitnesses 
must also contend with fillers. Therefore, positive identification in culprit-present lineups are 
associated not only with culprit identifications, but with filler identifications. This means that, in 
lineups, false alarms can occur in both the culprit-present and culprit-absent conditions. 
Therefore, it was determined that using showups would allow for a cleaner interpretation of 
identification rates. Although it is unlikely that the findings in this study would change 
dramatically if lineups were used in place of showups, future studies may consider using lineups 
to allow for better generalizability of findings to the criminal justice system. 
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Conclusion 
The results of this study indicate that, while victim-bystander status may only have a 
negligible impact on eyewitness decision-making during showup procedures, victim-bystander 
status can significantly influence eyewitnesses’ perceived ability to identify a culprit and their 
willingness to testify in court. These findings suggest that eyewitnesses may bolster their 
retrospective judgments of the crime, even in the absence of true differences in performance. 
Overall, these findings add to the growing number of studies demonstrating the malleability of 
eyewitness testimony.  
This study had originally aimed to resolve the conflicting findings in earlier research 
(Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Kassin, 1984) by developing a victim-bystander status paradigm that 
addressed the limitations of these early studies. Although this study still leaves many questions 
regarding victim-bystander status unanswered, it does provide a small advance in methods and 
knowledge over previous victim-bystander status research. Specifically, two facets of the 
paradigm developed for this study reflect strengths that can be applied not only to future victim-
bystander research, but to eyewitness identification research in general. 
First, this paradigm eliminated attention and encoding as possible mediators by delaying 
the victim-bystander status manipulation until immediately prior to the showup procedure. This 
ensured that no participants saw the actual theft occur and that participants became aware of the 
theft at the same time that they became aware of their status as a victim or bystander to the 
cellphone theft. One benefit of this approach is that one can disentangle effects of estimator 
variables on eyewitness memory and decision-making. Although one cannot rule out effects on 
recall processes at the time of identification, it is useful from an experimental perspective to 
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account for attention and encoding when examining the effects on eyewitness decision-making 
and performance. 
Second, participants in the current paradigm were debriefed only after they made an 
identification decision and completed all post-identification measures. Accordingly, participants’ 
decision-making occurred under the belief that their decisions could have real consequences for 
both the culprit and the resolution of the cellphone theft. In addition, post-identification measures 
were completed under the guise of a campus theft report, accessed via a series of bogus 
university webpages. This ensured that eyewitnesses continued to believe that their decision-
making could have real consequences, even after the showup procedure had concluded. 
Accordingly, this study provides the field with a paradigm that allows researchers to maintain 
both high internal and ecological validity, even after an identification procedure occurs. 
This second facet in particular makes the current paradigm promising for use in future 
research. Existing experimental paradigms have concentrated on eyewitness decision-making in 
situations where the identification outcome has little to no risk. The paradigm employed in this 
study can potentially be used to examine other aspects of eyewitness identification (e.g., 
comparing showups and lineups) in a context in which eyewitnesses believe that the 
consequences of their identification decision could have real consequences. This opens up 
several avenues for future research, including the follow-up studies mentioned in the discussion 
above. Accordingly, the paradigm developed in this study has the potential to contribute to the 
field in a manner that extends beyond the results of this single study.  
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Table 1 
Means for Self-Reported Retrospective Negative Affect, N = 292 
 Culprit Absent Culprit Present 
 M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Bystander     
Activation 1.42 (0.53) [1.27, 1.56] 1.47 (0.56) [1.33, 1.62]  
Anger  2.10 (0.91) [2.10, 2.36] 2.63 (1.18) [1.83, 2.34]  
Anxiety 2.47 (0.96) [2.20, 2.73] 2.37 (1.01) [2.11, 2.64] 
Confusion 2.61 (0.85) [2.39, 2.83] 2.57 (0.86) [2.35, 2.78] 
Dejection 1.89 (0.81) [1.68, 2.11] 1.91 (0.81) [1.69, 2.12] 
Fatigue 1.51 (0.63) [1.33, 1.69] 1.45 (0.60) [1.27, 1.62] 
Victim     
Activation 1.67 (0.74) [1.53, 1.81] 1.53 (0.60) [1.39, 1.67] 
Anger  2.76 (1.27) [2.51, 3.00] 2.63 (1.18) [2.39. 2.88] 
Anxiety 2.92 (1.27) [2.67, 3.18] 2.81 (1.20) [2.56, 3.06] 
Confusion 2.64 (0.99) [2.44, 2.85] 2.58 (0.95) [2.37, 2.79] 
Dejection 2.25 (0.99) [2.05, 2.46] 2.18 (1.00) [1.98, 2.39] 
Fatigue 1.77 (0.91) [1.60, 1.94] 1.60 (0.74) [1.58, 1.92] 
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, CI = confidence interval.  
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Table 2 
MANOVA Analysis of Effects of Manipulations on Retrospective Negative Affect, N = 292 
 Wilk's Λ (F) df p d (ηp2) LL UL 
Intercepts .084    (514.28) 6, 283 <.001    
    Activation (1768.87) 3, 288 <.001    
    Anger (1401.23) 3, 288 <.001    
    Anxiety (1615.22) 3, 288 <.001    
    Confusion (2343.57) 3, 288 <.001    
    Dejection (1479.11) 3, 288 <.001    
    Fatigue (1327.55) 3, 288 <.001    
CP  .996          (.19) 6, 283 .979 (<.01) <.01 <.01 
    Activation (.31) 3, 288 .581         .07 –.16 .29 
    Anger (.30) 3, 288 .582         .06 –.17 .29 
    Anxiety (.64) 3, 288 .426         .09 –.14 .32 
    Confusion (.24) 3, 288 .624         .06 –.17 .29 
    Dejection (.07) 3, 288 .791         .03 –.20 .26 
    Fatigue (.25) 3, 288 .619         .06 –.17 .29 
VBS .864        (7.44) 6, 283 <.001 (.13) .06 .19 
    Activation (4.73) 3, 288 .030         .25 .02 .49 
    Anger (22.28) 3, 288 <.001         .55 .32 .79 
    Anxiety (14.61) 3, 288 .001         .45 .22 .68 
    Confusion (.04) 3, 288 .831         .02 –.21 .25 
    Dejection (7.35) 3, 288 .003         .32 .09 .55 
    Fatigue (5.77) 3, 288 .002         .28 .05 .51 
CP * VBS .989          (.51) 6, 283 .801  (.01) <.01 .02 
    Activation (1.76) 3, 288 .186         .16 –.07 .39 
    Anger (.18) 3, 288 .669         .05 –.18 .28 
    Anxiety (.01) 3, 288 .939         .01 –.22 .24 
    Confusion (.01) 3, 288 .907         .01 –.22 .24 
    Dejection (.14) 3, 288 .705         .04 –.19 .27 
    Fatigue (.05) 3, 288 .820         .03 –.20 .26 
Note. Cronbach’s  = .96. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; d  = 
Cohen’s d; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit of Cohen’s d for 95% CI; UL = upper 
limit of Cohen’s d for 95% CI. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, 
culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, bystander = –1). Estimates for Cohen’s d and partial eta-
squared (ηp2) were calculated with a script developed by Wuensch (2012). 
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Table 3 
Frequencies and Means for Self-Reported Retrospective Motivations to Avoid Identification 
Errors, N = 292 
 Culprit Absent Culprit Present 
 M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Bystander     
Dichotomous  
Motivation Measure 
0.28 (0.45) [0.17, 0.39] 0.23 (0.42) [0.13, 0.33] 
Motivation to Avoid 
Innocent Suspect 
4.68 (1.18) [4.39, 4.97] 4.36 (1.34) [4.07, 4.65] 
Motivation to Catch 
Guilty Culprit 
3.75 (1.33) [3.43, 4.08] 4.01 (1.25) [3.69, 4.34] 
Combined  
Motivation Measure  
3.32 (1.99) [2.80, 3.84] 3.74 (2.24) [3.23, 4.26] 
Victim     
Dichotomous  
Motivation Measure 
0.17 (0.38) [0.09, 0.25] 0.29 (0.46) [0.21, 0.37] 
Motivation to Avoid 
Innocent Suspect 
4.84 (1.10)  [4.57, 5.12] 4.24 (1.32) [3.96, 4.52] 
Motivation to Catch 
Guilty Culprit 
3.43 (1.52) [3.12, 3.74] 3.83 (1.38) [3.52, 4.14] 
Combined  
Motivation Measure  
3.44 (2.26) [2.95, 3.93] 3.78 (2.20) [3.29, 4.27] 
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, CI = confidence interval. Mean values for the 
dichotomous motivation measure represent the proportion of participants who reported that it 
was more important to catch the guilty culprit than to avoid an innocent suspect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
Table 4 
Using Logistic Regression to Test Effects of Manipulations on Dichotomous Motivation 
Measure, N = 292 
 β 95% CI Wald p OR 95% CI 
Intercept –1.17 [–1.44, –.90]     
CP     .22 [–.33, .77]   .65 .422 1.25 [.72, 2.16] 
VBS   –.15 [–.70, .40]   .31 .580   .86 [.50, 1.49] 
CP * VBS     .95 [–.15, 2.05] 2.88 .090 2.56 [.62, 6.58] 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; SE = standard error; OR = odds 
ratio. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = 
+1, bystander = –1). ORs for main effects calculated as exp(2b) and represent differences 
between factor levels, which were effect coded at –1 and +1. OR for interaction calculated as 
exp(4b) and represents the ratio of ORs associated with the constituent simple main effects.  
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Table 5 
MANOVA Analysis of Effects of Manipulations on Continuous Motivation Measures, N = 156 
 Wilk's Λ (F) df  p d (ηp2) LL UL 
Intercepts  .025 (3782.63) 3, 286 <.001    
   Motivation to  
   catch guilty culprit (782.43) 1, 288 <.001    
   Motivation to avoid  
   innocent suspect (3904.40) 1, 288 <.001    
   Combined motivation 
   measure (2170.45) 1, 288 <.001    
CP .960 (3.98) 3, 286 .008 (.04) <.01 .09 
   Motivation to  
   catch guilty culprit (4.20) 1, 288 .041 .24 .01 .47 
   Motivation to avoid  
   innocent suspect (10.32) 1, 288 .001 .38 .14 .61 
   Combined motivation 
   measure (2.21) 1, 288 .138 .17 –.06 .40 
VBS .984 (1.57) 3, 286 .197 (.02) <.01 .05 
   Motivation to  
   catch guilty culprit (2.50) 1, 288 .115 .19 –.04 .42 
   Motivation to avoid  
   innocent suspect (.022) 1, 288 .883 .02 –.21 .25 
   Combined motivation 
   measure (.094) 1, 288 .760 .04 –.19 .27 
CP*VBS .993 (.66) 3, 286 .577 (.01) <.01 .03 
   Motivation to  
   catch guilty culprit (.188) 1, 288 .665 .05 –.18 .28 
   Motivation to avoid  
   innocent suspect (.954) 1, 288 .329 .11 –.12 .34 
   Combined motivation 
   measure (.031) 1, 288 .861 .02 –.21 .25 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; d  = Cohen’s d; CI = confidence 
interval; LL = lower limit of Cohen’s d for 95% CI; UL = upper limit of Cohen’s d for 95% 
CI. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1). Estimates and corresponding confidence intervals for Cohen’s d and partial 
eta squared (ηp2) were calculated with a script developed by Wuensch (2012). 
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Table 6 
Identification Rates and Signal Detection Measures. 
 Culprit IDs Innocent IDs d’ c 
Victims 77.5%   (80) 30.8%   (78)  1.257 –.127 
Bystanders 72.0%   (75) 30.0%   (70) 1.107 –.029 
Overall 74.8% (155) 30.4% (148) 1.180 –.077 
Note. Values in parentheses refer to the number of participants in that condition. d' = 
discriminability index, c = response bias index. Differences between victims and bystanders in 
d’ (p = .629) and c (p = .195) were nonsignificant. 
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Table 7 
Using Logistic Regression to Test Effects of Manipulations on Identification Rates, N = 303 
 β 95% CI Wald p OR 95% CI 
Intercept   .13 [–.12, .38]     
CP 1.92 [1.41, 2.43] 1.18 <.001 6.82 [4.11, 11.31] 
VBS   .16 [–.34, .67] 1.29 .524 1.18 [.71, 1.95] 
CP * VBS   .26 [–.76, 1.27] .246 .620 1.29 [.47, 3.55] 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; SE = standard error; OR = odds 
ratio. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1). ORs for main effects calculated as exp(2b) and represent differences 
between factor levels, which were effect coded at -1 and +1. OR for interaction calculated as 
exp(4b) and represents the ratio of ORs associated with the constituent simple main effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Immediate Confidence Ratings and Response Latency (N = 303) 
 Culprit-absent  Culprit-present 
 Bystanders Victims  Bystanders Victims 
 M 95% CI M 95% CI  M 95% CI M 95% CI 
Immediate confidence         
    Identifiers     6.43 [5.57, 7.29]   7.33 [6.69, 7.98]    7.44 [7.03, 7.86]  7.29 [6.70, 7.88] 
    Non-identifiers    7.25 [6.59, 7.90]   6.65 [5.84, 7.46]    6.81 [5.69, 7.93]  5.89 [4.87, 6.91] 
Response latency          
    Identifiers 34.89 [28.00, 41.78] 25.13 [21.91, 28.35]  39.60 [33.36, 45.84] 30.58 [26.06, 35.10] 
    Non-identifiers 24.42 [21.00, 27.84] 28.76 [24.95, 32.57]  37.82 [28.63, 46.99] 22.53 [18.69, 26.37] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. Response latency is measured in seconds. 
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Table 9 
Two-Way ANOVAs Examining Effects of Manipulations on Immediate Confidence Ratings 
and Response Latency for Identifications and Rejections 
 F df  p d LL UL 
Immediate confidence 
(Identifications, n = 161)        
    Intercept 1784.18 1, 157 <.001    
    CP 2.08 1, 157 .151 .25 –.09 .60 
    VBS 1.24 1, 157 .268 .20 –.15 .54 
    CP * VBS 2.46 1, 157 .119 .26 –.07 .59 
Immediate confidence     
(Rejections, n = 142)       
    Intercept 757.62 1, 138 <.001    
    CP 1.53 1, 138 .218 .23 –.14 .60 
    VBS 2.47 1, 138 .119 .30 –.07 .67 
    CP * VBS .11 1, 138 .738 .06 –.27 .38 
Response latencya  
(Identifications, n = 159)       
    Intercept 890.93 1, 155 <.001    
    CP .04 1, 155 .956 .04 –.31 .38 
    VBS 2.92 1, 155 .093 .27 –.04 .59 
    CP * VBS <.01 1, 155 .929 .01 –.31 .32 
Response latencya  
(Rejections, n = 139)       
    Intercept 974.06 1, 135 <.001    
    CP .33 1, 135  .567 .11 –.26 .48 
    VBS .17 1, 135  .678 .08 –.29 .45 
    CP * VBS 2.97 1, 135  .087 .29 –.04 .63 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; d  = Cohen’s d; CI = confidence 
interval; LL = lower limit of Cohen’s d for 95% CI; UL = upper limit of Cohen’s d for 95% 
CI. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1). Cohen’s d and the corresponding confidence intervals were calculated with 
a script developed by Wuensch (2012). 
aResponse latency was log-transformed to reduce positive skew in the data. 
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Table 10 
Means for Post-Identification Judgments of Ability to Identify the Culprit by Eyewitnesses 
Who Made a Positive Identification, N = 156 
 Culprit Absent Culprit Present 
 M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Bystander     
   Viewing quality 4.76 (2.41) [3.61, 5.92] 6.78 (2.80) [6.03, 7.53] 
   Specific facial features 3.57 (1.83) [2.49, 4.65] 5.32 (2.64) [4.62, 6.02] 
   Attention paid 3.19 (1.91) [2.06, 4.32] 4.00 (2.46) [3.27, 4.73] 
   Clarity of image 4.67 (1.83) [3.59, 5.74] 5.38 (2.47) [4.68, 6.08] 
   Recognition memory 6.52 (2.27) [5.49, 7.56] 6.08 (2.36) [5.41, 6.75] 
Victim     
   Viewing quality 6.29 (3.01) [5.21, 7.37] 6.79 (2.52) [6.11, 7.46] 
   Specific facial features 5.42 (2.59) [4.41, 6.43] 4.93 (2.56) [4.62, 6.02] 
   Attention paid 4.96 (2.82) [3.90, 6.01] 4.11 (2.85) [3.45, 4.78] 
   Clarity of image 6.17 (2.57) [5.16, 7.17] 5.90 (2.68) [5.27, 6.53] 
   Recognition memory 6.46 (2.30) [5.49, 7.42] 6.39 (2.49) [5.79, 7.00] 
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, CI = confidence interval.  
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Table 11 
Means for Post-Identification Judgments of Perceived Decision-Making Performance and 
Willingness to Testify by Eyewitnesses Who Made a Positive Identification. N = 156 
 Culprit Absent Culprit Present 
 M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Bystander     
Delayed Confidence 56.10 (22.24) [46.02, 66.17] 67.94 (21.28) [61.41, 74.47] 
Basis for ID  5.67   (2.20) [4.64, 6.70]]     6.18   (2.84) [5.51, 6.85] 
Ease of ID 4.76   (2.19) [3.61, 5.91] 6.12   (2.58) [5.37, 6.87] 
Time to ID 5.19   (2.68) [3.99, 6.39] 3.60   (2.75) [2.82, 4.28] 
Willingness to Testify 3.86   (2.52) [2.64, 5.08] 5.40   (2.84) [4.61, 6.19] 
Victim     
Delayed Confidence 67.25 (22.70) [57.83, 76.67] 70.89 (25.50) [64.98, 76.80] 
Basis for ID  6.17   (2.84) [5.20, 7.13] 6.59   (2.36) [5.99, 7.20] 
Ease of ID 5.79   (2.83) [4.72, 6.87] 6.39   (2.82) [5.72, 7.07] 
Time to ID 4.25   (3.05) [3.12, 5.38] 2.87   (2.76) [2.16, 3.58] 
Willingness to Testify 6.33   (2.62) [5.19, 7.48] 6.15   (3.00) [5.43, 6.86] 
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, CI = confidence interval. 
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Table 12 
MANOVA Analysis of Post-Identification Judgments of Ability to Identify the Culprit by 
Eyewitnesses Who Made a Positive Identification, N = 156 
 Wilk's Λ (F) df  p d (ηp2) LL UL 
Intercepts  .117  (223.25) 5, 148 <.001    
   Viewing quality (672.84) 1, 152 <.001    
   Specific facial features (468.63) 1, 152 <.001    
   Attention paid (307.48) 1, 152 <.001    
   Clarity of image (624.48) 1, 152 <.001    
   Recognition memory (901.38) 1, 152 <.001    
CP .917     (2.68) 5, 148 .024 (.08) <.01 .15 
   Viewing quality (7.01) 1, 152 .009     .47 .12 .82 
   Specific facial features (2.03) 1, 152 .156     .25 –.10 .60 
   Attention paid (<.01) 1, 152 .971     .01 –.34 .35 
   Clarity of image (.26) 1, 152 .613     .09 –.26 .44 
   Recognition memory (.36) 1, 152 .549     .11 –.24 .45 
VBS .949     (1.60) 5, 148 .163 (.05) <.01 .10 
   Viewing quality (2.62) 1, 152 .108     .26 –.06 .58 
   Specific facial features (2.69) 1, 152 .103     .26 –.05 .58 
   Attention paid (4.12) 1, 152 .044     .33 .01 .64 
   Clarity of image (5.22) 1, 152 .024     .37 .05 .69 
   Recognition memory (.09) 1, 152 .770     .05 –.27 .36 
CP*VBS .925     (2.39) 5, 148 .040 (.07) <.01 .14 
   Viewing quality (2.57) 1, 152 .111     .26 –.06 .57 
   Specific facial features (6.30) 1, 152 .013     .40 .08 .72 
   Attention paid (3.18) 1, 152 .077     .29 –.03 .60 
   Clarity of image (1.22) 1, 152 .271     .18 –.14 .49 
   Recognition memory (.20) 1, 152 .656     .07 –.24 .39 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; d  = Cohen’s d; CI = confidence 
interval; LL = lower limit of Cohen’s d for 95% CI; UL = upper limit of Cohen’s d for 95% 
CI. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1). Estimates and corresponding confidence intervals for Cohen’s d and partial 
eta squared (ηp2) were calculated with a script developed by Wuensch (2012). 
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Table 13 
MANOVA Analysis of Post-Identification Judgments of Perceived Decision-Making 
Performance by Eyewitnesses Who Made a Positive Identification, N = 156 
 Wilk's Λ (F) df  p d (ηp2) LL UL 
Intercepts  .037  (972.42) 4, 149 <.001    
   Delayed Confidence (1002.06) 1, 152 <.001    
   Basis for ID (841.37) 1, 152 <.001    
   Ease of ID (593.87) 1, 152 <.001    
   Time to ID (258.39) 1, 152 <.001    
CP .940      (2.37) 4, 149 .056 (.06) <.01 .12 
   Delayed Confidence (3.49) 1, 152 .064     .33 –.02 .68 
   Basis for ID (1.22) 1, 152 .271     .20 –.15 .54 
   Ease of ID (4.28) 1, 152 .040     .37 .02 .71 
   Time to ID (9.02) 1, 152 .003 .53 .18 .88 
VBS .977        (.89) 4, 149 .475 (.02) <.01 .06 
   Delayed Confidence (2.90) 1, 152 .091     .27 –.04 .59 
   Basis for ID (1.15) 1, 152 .285     .17 –.14 .49 
   Ease of ID (1.90) 1, 152 .171     .22 –.09 .54 
   Time to ID (2.85) 1, 152 .093     .27 –.05 .59 
CP*VBS .984        (.81) 4, 149 .657 (.02) <.01 .06 
   Delayed Confidence (.98) 1, 152 .323     .16 –.16 .47 
   Basis for ID (.01) 1, 152 .916     .02 –.30 .33 
   Ease of ID (.64) 1, 152 .426     .13 –.19 .44 
   Time to ID (.05) 1, 152 .833     .04 –.28 .35 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; d  = Cohen’s d; CI = confidence 
interval; LL = lower limit of Cohen’s d for 95% CI; UL = upper limit of Cohen’s d for 95% 
CI. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1). Estimates and corresponding confidence intervals for Cohen’s d and partial 
eta squared (ηp2) were calculated with a script developed by Wuensch (2012). 
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Table 14 
ANOVA Analysis of Post-Identification Willingness to Testify by Eyewitnesses Who Made a 
Positive Identification, N = 156 
 F df  p d LL UL 
Intercepts  486.61 1, 152 .009    
CP 1.83 1, 152 .179 .24 –.11 .59 
VBS 10.31 1, 152 .002 .52 .20 .84 
CP*VBS 2.96 1, 152 .087 .28 –.04 .59 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; d  = Cohen’s d; CI = confidence 
interval; LL = lower limit of Cohen’s d for 95% CI; UL = upper limit of Cohen’s d for 95% 
CI. Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1). Estimates and confidence intervals for Cohen’s d were calculated with a 
script developed by Wuensch (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Table 15 
Mediation Effects of Anger on the Relationship between Experimental Effects and Attention 
Paid to the Culprit, N = 156 
  95% CI  
Effect β Lower Upper p 
Total      
    Intercept 5.07 4.61 5.52 <.001 
    CP –.01 –.47   .45 .971 
    VBS .47   .01   .93 .044   
    CP * VBS –.41 –.87   .04   .077 
Direct     
    Intercept 3.82 2.79 4.85 <.001 
    Anger .07   .02   .13 .009 
    CP .06 –.39   .51 .787 
    VBS .30 –.16   .77 .197 
    CP * VBS –.36 –.81   .09 .119 
Indirect (mediation)     
    Anger .16   .03   .41 <.050 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; SE = standard error. 
Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1).  
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Table 16 
Mediation Effects of Anger on the Relationship between Experimental Effects and Number of 
Specific Facial Features of the Culprit Attended To, N = 156 
  95% CI  
Effect β Lower Upper p 
Total      
    Intercept 5.85 5.39 6.30 <.001 
    CP .33 –.12   .79   .108 
    VBS .37 –.08   .83   .150 
    CP * VBS –.57         –1.03 –.12   .014 
Direct     
    Intercept 5.67 4.62 6.72 <.001 
    Anger .01 –.04   .06 .715 
    CP .34 –.12   .80 .143 
    VBS .35 –.12   .82 .147 
    CP * VBS –.56         –1.02 –.10 .017 
Indirect (mediation)     
    Anger .02           –.13   .18 >.050 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; SE = standard error. 
Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1).  
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Table 17 
Mediation Effects of Anger on the Relationship between Experimental Effects and Clarity of 
Culprit’s Face, N = 156 
  95% CI  
Effect β Lower Upper p 
Total      
    Intercept 6.53 6.09 6.97 <.001 
    CP .11 –.33   .55   .613 
    VBS .51   .07   .94   .024 
    CP * VBS –.24 –.68   .19   .271 
Direct     
    Intercept 5.99 4.98 6.99 <.001 
    Anger .03 –.02   .08 .237 
    CP .14 –.30   .58 .522 
    VBS .43 –.02   .89 .060 
    CP * VBS –.22 –.66   .22 .321 
Indirect (mediation)     
    Anger .07  –.04   .25 >.050 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; SE = standard error. 
Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1).  
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Table 18 
Mediation Effects of Anger on the Relationship between Experimental Effects and Willingness 
to Testify in Court About Identification Decision, N = 156 
  95% CI  
Effect β Lower Upper p 
Total      
    Intercept 6.43 5.94 6.93 <.001 
    CP .34 –.16   .84   .179 
    VBS .81   .31 1.30   .002 
    CP * VBS –.43 –.93   .06   .087 
Direct     
    Intercept 5.91 4.77 7.05 <.001 
    Anger .03 –.03   .09 .317 
    CP .37 –.13   .87 .147 
    VBS .74   .22 1.25 .005 
    CP * VBS –.41 –.91   .09 .107 
Indirect (mediation)     
    Anger .07 –.06   .26 >.050 
Note. CP = culprit presence; VBS = victim-bystander status; SE = standard error. 
Manipulations were effect-coded (culprit-present = +1, culprit-absent = –1; victim = +1, 
bystander = –1).  
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APPENDIX A 
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
1.   Age (in years):  ________  
2.   Sex:  Female     Male 
3.   Ethnicity:   European American 
  African American 
  Native American 
  Latin American, Hispanic, or Latina/o 
  Middle Eastern 
  Asian or Asian-American 
  Multi-ethnic (please specify) __________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
BOGUS COMMUNICATION TASK 
 
Back-to-Back Communication Task Participant Instructions and Shapes 
Prior to starting the task, the experimenter will give the following instruction to the participant 
and her or his partner. The experimenter will also give the participant a pad of paper and a 
pencil. This task serves as a retention interval filler task and as part of the cover story. 
 
Instruction: In this task, you and your partner will pair up back-to-back and attempt to re-create 
a drawing with only limited verbal instructions. (To participant) Your partner will give you 
verbal instructions on how to draw the image or shape, without actually telling you what the 
shape is. I have already explained the rules to your partner. You will have 5 minutes to get 
through as many of the shapes as you can and 5 minutes to complete the partner rating survey.  
 
Below are the shapes that will be used as part of the task.  
 
 
Square:     Triangle:    Thin Rectangle:  
   
 
 
 
Sideways Pentagon:    Diamond:   Circle with “X” Inside: 
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Back-to-Back Communication Task Confederate Instructions 
 
The following instructions will be read to the participant by her or his partner. 
 
Easy Shapes: 
1. Square 
 Draw a vertical line. From where you ended the vertical line, draw a horizontal 
line to the right that is the same length as the vertical line. From where you ended 
the horizontal line, draw a vertical line going up that is the same length as the 
other vertical line. Draw a line connecting the tops of the vertical lines.  
2. Triangle  
 Draw a vertical line. From where you ended the vertical line, draw a horizontal 
line to the right. Draw a line connecting the two ends.  
3. Thin rectangle  
 Draw two, long, parallel lines horizontally of the same length. Connect the two 
right ends. Connect the two left ends. 
 
Medium Shapes: 
1. Sideways pentagon 
 Draw a horizontal line to the left. From where you ended the horizontal line, draw 
a vertical line of the same length, going down. From where you ended the vertical 
line, draw a horizontal line to the right that is the same length. Draw a diagonal 
line up and to the right, that ends at the halfway point of the vertical line. Connect 
the end of the diagonal line to the start of the first horizontal line.  
2. Diamond: 
 Draw a horizontal line to the right. Draw a diagonal line up and to the left that 
ends at the halfway point of the horizontal line. Connect the end of the diagonal 
line to the start of the first horizontal line. From the start of the horizontal line, 
draw a diagonal line down and to the right that ends at the halfway point of the 
horizontal line. Connect the end of that diagonal line to the end of the horizontal 
line. 
3. Circle with ‘X’ inside 
 Draw a diagonal line down, to the right. Draw another diagonal line down and to 
the left of the same length that crosses at the middle of the first line. Draw another 
line of the same length that crosses at the middle of the first line. At the starting 
point of the first line, draw a curved line to the right that encompasses both lines 
and ends where you started.  
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Back-to-Back Communication Task Partner Rating Survey 
 
1. Please rate your partner on the following characteristics:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What did you like best about your partner?        
 
             
 
             
 
 
3. What did you like least about your partner?        
 
             
 
             
 
 
4. If presented with additional communication tasks, would you prefer to continue working with 
the same partner or be assigned to a different partner? Please respond on the following scale.   
 
 
  
unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 friendly 
quiet 1 2 3 4 5 talkative 
dependent 1 2 3 4 5 independent 
unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 intelligent 
needy 1 2 3 4 5 self-reliant 
unlikeable 1 2 3 4 5 likeable 
gave directions poorly 1 2 3 4 5 gave directions 
well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strong 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Moderate 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Slight 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Slight 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
Moderate 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
Strong 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
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APPENDIX C 
CULPRIT AND INNOCENT SUSPECT PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
Photographs used in the showup procedure will be taken using a Digital Single Lens Reflex 
(DSLR) camera with the consent of Iowa State students. Each photograph will have no other 
identifying information attached to it. Permission to use these photographs will be acquired 
before their use in the experiment. After the experiment, participants will be informed that the 
subjects of the photograph committed no crimes, and were merely a part of the experiment 
 
For each “thief”, there will be one culprit photograph and three innocent suspect photographs. 
Each photograph will be of an individual against a vertical white background with a towel 
covering up their clothing. Each participant will be shown a single photograph of either the 
guilty culprit or an innocent suspect. Upon viewing the photograph on a lab computer, the 
experimenter will verbally ask participants to confirm whether the person in the photograph is 
the “thief” that they saw earlier. The experimenter may also verbally ask the participant to give a 
confidence rating (e.g., so…on a scale of 1-10, how confident are you that this is/is not the 
thief?).  
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APPENDIX D 
SUSPICION CHECK FORM 
 
1. Please indicate what you knew about this study before participating. 
 
             
 
             
 
             
 
2. Sometimes the true purpose of a study is not obvious, and researchers are investigating 
something that is very different from what they tell the participant. Do you believe that 
this was the case in this study?  
 
Yes:                No: ____    
 
 
3. If “Yes”, please indicate what you think the true purpose of this study was. 
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APPENDIX E 
BOGUS CAMPUS THEFT REPORT 
 
The following questions will be presented as an official campus theft report form available on 
the Dean of Students Office webpage. They will be presented via Qualtrics.  
1. At approximately what time did the incident occur? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Please provide a description of the incident in as much detail as you can.  
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Did you witness the incident occur? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
4. Did you see the person who committed the crime (i.e., the perpetrator)? 
  Yes 
  No 
If you answered “Yes” to Question 4, please answer the following questions. 
 
5. Please provide a description of the perpetrator in as much detail as you can. 
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Were you an acquaintance, friend, or relative of the perpetrator? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
7. Were you asked to identify the perpetrator from a photograph, showup, or lineup? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
8. At the time you identified the person in the photograph, showup, or lineup, how certain 
were you that the person you identified was the perpetrator? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Not at 
all 
certain 
         Totally 
Certain 
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9. At the time of the incident, how good a view did you get of the perpetrator? 
 
 
10. At the time of the incident, how well were you able to make out specific features of the 
perpetrator’s face? 
 
 
11. At the time of the incident, how much attention were you paying to the face of the 
perpetrator? 
 
 
12. To what extent do you feel that you had a good basis to make an identification? 
 
 
13. How easy was it for you to figure out whether the person in the photograph, showup, or 
lineup was the perpetrator? 
 
 
 
 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
poor 
         Very 
good 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at 
all 
         Very 
well 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
None          My total 
attention 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No 
basis 
at all 
         A very 
good 
basis 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
difficult 
         Extremely 
easy 
14. From the time that you were first shown a photograph of the suspected perpetrator, how 
much time do you estimate it took you to make an identification? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I needed 
almost 
no time 
         I had to think 
about the lineup 
for a long time 
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15. On the basis of your memory of the culprit, how willing would you have been to testify in 
court that the person you identified was the same person you commit the crime? 
 
 
16. Generally, how good is your recognition memory for faces of strangers you have 
encountered on only one prior occasion? 
 
 
17. How clear is the image you have in your memory of the person you saw? 
 
 
 
18. Have you ever been a victim of a crime prior to this incident? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
 
19. (If “Yes” on Question 18) Have you ever been a victim of the same type of crime as the 
current incident?  
  Yes 
  No 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all 
willing 
         Totally 
willing 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
poor 
         Excellent 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all 
clear 
         Very 
clear 
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APPENDIX F 
SHORTENED PROFILE OF MOOD STATES 
 
Directions:  Below is a list of words that describe feelings people have.  Please read each feeling 
carefully, and mark the answer that best describes how you felt RIGHT AFTER you 
discovered [your/your partner’s] cellphone was missing. 
 Not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
Tense        
Angry        
Worn Out        
Unhappy        
Lively        
Confused        
Peeved        
Sad        
Active        
On edge        
Grouchy        
Blue        
Energetic        
Hopeless        
Uneasy        
Restless        
Unable to concentrate        
Fatigued        
Annoyed        
Discouraged        
Resentful        
Nervous        
Miserable        
Cheerful        
Bitter        
Exhausted        
Anxious        
Helpless        
Weary        
Bewildered        
Furious        
Full of pep        
Worthless        
Forgetful        
Vigorous        
Uncertain about things      
Bushed      
100 
 
APPENDIX G 
MANIPULATION CHECKS 
 
1. Which of the following did you consider to be most important when you were asked to 
decide whether the photograph was of the actual thief? (Select only one) 
  Making sure the guilty culprit didn’t get away 
  Not accusing an innocent person of a crime 
 
2. When you were asked to decide whether the photograph was of the actual thief, were you 
more concerned about the possibility of identifying an innocent person, or about letting the 
guilty culprit get away with the crime? 
 
 
3. When I was asked to identify the person in the photograph, I was most focused on 
ensuring that the guilty culprit didn’t get away. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. When I was asked to identify the person in the photograph, I was most focused on 
ensuring that I did not accuse an innocent suspect of a crime. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly  
disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Agree Strongly  
agree 
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APPENDIX H 
DEBRIEFING 
 
At this point, I’d like to tell you about the experiment. It’s very important that you not share this 
information with others who might participate in our study in the future. If a participant knew the study’s purpose 
before participating, their data would be invalid and our findings would be invalid as a result.  
                         
This study was designed to examine how being a victim or bystander to a crime can affect eyewitnesses’ 
ability to accurately identify suspects. All participants were told that they were going to be part of a communication 
study in which they work with a partner both in person and via cellphones. In addition, all participants saw a person 
walk into the room with cellphones at the beginning of the experiment, and were later told that a cellphone was 
missing. This is not true. We manipulated victim-bystander status by telling some participants that their cellphone 
was missing, and telling other participants that their partner’s cellphone was missing. In reality, the cellphone was 
never moved out of the room, and the thief is actually a confederate working with the research team. (If in Victim 
Condition) Your cellphone is safe in the room next door, and we will be giving it back to you in just a couple of 
minutes. We also want to let you know that if you feel upset by today’s study, we have information on how to 
contact the Student Counseling Center, if you would like to have it. 
 
All participants were then asked to identify the fake thief from a photograph on the computer. The 
photographs that were taken at the beginning of the study were used as a cover story for why we had a photograph 
of the potential suspect; your photograph was never intended to be used as part of this study and will be deleted 
without further use. Half the participants were shown a photo of the “thief” that they saw enter the room earlier, 
while the other half of participants were shown a photo of someone matching the thief’s description.  
 
In addition to the above procedures, all participants filled out a Campus Theft Report. However, this form 
is not real, and was created for the purpose of this experiment. Your responses to the form are anonymous, and there 
will be no consequences for any of your responses. Finally, throughout the experiment, all participants in the study 
completed a battery of surveys that may have assessed demographics, academic achievement, memory, and 
personality, etc. 
 
I also want to explain why we did all of this. Eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful 
conviction in the United States. The accuracy of identification is determined by how well you remember the 
culprit’s face, but is also determined by your decision to choose or not choose a suspect in a lineup. Sometimes a 
person’s memory for a culprit’s face is strong, but they decide not pick him or her. Other times, a person’s memory 
for a culprit’s face is weak, but they decide to identify him or her anyway.  
 
The underlying purpose of this research is to understand how eyewitnesses who are victims or bystanders 
decide whether or not to identify a suspect. Since many eyewitnesses are also the victims in a crime, it is important 
to understand whether these eyewitnesses make identification decisions differently than eyewitnesses who are 
simply bystanders.  
 
We didn’t tell you this up front because sometimes people will consciously or unconsciously change their 
behavior if they know what the true purpose of a study is about. Because of this, it’s very important that you not 
share this information with others who might participate in our study in the future. If a participant knew what the 
study was about before participating, their data would be invalid and our study would be ruined. Do you promise not 
to tell? If somebody asks you what the study is about, you can tell them it’s about cellphone communication, and 
that during the experiment you answered surveys and worked with a partner on some communication games. 
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APPENDIX I 
IRB APPROVAL LETTER 
 
 
